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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the determinants of the size 
of penalties awarded by the courts under the Fair Trading Act 1986.   
The law and economics theory of optimal penalties provides the 
theoretical framework.   This is used to develop a theory of optimal 
judicial sentencing based on the assumption that similar “optimality 
considerations” operate at both legislative and judicial levels. 
 
The factors judges take into account in sentencing in Fair Trading Act 
cases, as disclosed in their written decisions, are quantified and used to 
approximate the optimality considerations.   In this manner, features 
specific to the Fair Trading Act environment are accommodated. 
 
Using a sample of Fair Trading Act cases, econometric analysis is 
employed to test whether the theory developed in this study is, in fact, 
capable of explaining differences in the sizes of the penalties imposed 
by the courts.   While it is beyond the scope of this study to decide 
whether the individual penalties that have been imposed are optimal, an 
assessment is made about the extent to which optimality considerations 
explain the average variation in the size of penalties.  
 
The study found that optimality considerations do explain some but not 
all of the variation in the size of penalties.   In particular, four variables 
-whether the defendant intended to breach the Act, whether the 
defendant had previously breached the Fair Trading Act, whether the 
defendant is able to pay a large fine, and whether the defendant 
cooperated with the Commerce Commission in its inquiry - were shown 
to have a statistically significant impact on the size of the penalty. 
 
The study suggests that there is reasonable degree of consistency of 
judicial sentencing under the Fair Trading Act. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this study the determinants of the size of penalties awarded under the Fair Trading Act 
1986 (the Act) are examined. 
 
Fair Trading Act penalties have been considerably and persistently below the maximum 
penalties provided for in section 40, which contains the only criminal sentencing 
provision in the Act.   Under that section, an individual who contravenes the Act1 
commits an offence, and is liable to a maximum penalty of $30,000, while a body 
corporate is liable to a maximum penalty of $100,000.   The highest penalties awarded 
prior to 31 December 1998 were $15,0002 and $63,0003 respectively. 
 
A law and economics approach is used to provide a theoretical explanation for the size of 
penalties under the Fair Trading Act.   The theory behind this approach is articulated in 
recent literature on the economics of optimal penalties, particularly the work of Gary 
Becker (1968) and Nuno Garoupa (1997). 
 
The theory of optimal penalties is not strictly a theory of judicial sentencing because it 
implicitly assumes that there is no judicial discretion.   This distinction is relevant in the 
context of the Fair Trading Act because the Legislature and the Judiciary, in a sense, 
jointly determine the size of the penalty.   The Legislature sets the maximum fines in the 
Act, and the Judiciary sets the fines in particular cases.   The distinction is further 
relevant because it is the determinants of the size of individual fines, rather than the 
legislative maxima, which this study attempts to explain. 
 
Nevertheless, the distinction is one of subject, not form.   The theory of optimal penalties 
stems from a concern about the efficient or optimal allocation of society’s scarce 
resources to maintain a level of criminal activity that maximises social welfare, once the 
resources used to detect, convict and punish wrong doers are taken into account.   Judicial 
sentencing, on the other hand, is concerned with the provision of incentives (and 
disincentives) to individuals.   The same optimal sentencing considerations effectively 
operate at both the macro and the micro levels.  
 
As with judicial sentencing, the theory of optimal penalties extends in ‘form’ to the 
Commerce Commission’s decision-making process.   The Commerce Commission is an 
intermediate decision-making body, distinct from the Legislature and the Judiciary.   The 
Commission receives its authority from various provisions in the Act and has become the 
primary enforcer of the Act.   The Commission does not explicitly determine the size of 
penalties, but arguably exerts some influence, both through the screening and selection of 
complaints it receives from aggrieved parties not prepared or able to pursue private 
prosecution, and through the cases it chooses to pursue. 
 
                                                
1 Except sections 9, 14(2) and 23 of Part I. 
2 Commerce Commission v Sean Wright (Black Magic), Unreported, DC, Henderson, 1997. 
3 Commerce Commission v Bond and Bond, Unreported, DC, Christchurch, 1997. 
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This study, however, focuses on the process of judicial sentencing.   The study is 
insufficiently broad to conclude whether fines awarded to date are optimal, even if they 
are not maximal.   Instead, the study focuses on whether optimality considerations, as 
defined by the theory of optimal penalties, underlie judicial decisions to award fines 
considerably lower than the legislative maxima provided in the Act. 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows.   In section II the legislative framework of the 
Fair Trading Act is examined, with some comment on the purpose of the Act and the 
implications its interpretation has for sentencing under the Act.   A qualitative and 
diagrammatic analysis of the Commerce Commission’s decision-making process is 
presented in section III.   In section IV the theory of optimal judicial sentencing is 
outlined.   This involves a brief explanation of the law and economic approach; Becker’s 
original application of the theory to the area of criminal law; Garoupa’s synthesis of the 
body of literature that has followed; and the application of the theory to sentencing under 
the Fair Trading Act. 
 
Garoupa’s methodology supplies the framework for constructing the necessary 
econometric regression model to test this theory.   The econometric model and method of 
estimation are outlined in section V and the results and implications of the econometric 
analysis are the subject of section VI.   Section VII concludes the study. 
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II. THE FAIR TRADING ACT 1986 
 
A. Description of the Act 
 
The Fair Trading Act is described in its long title as: 
 
An Act to prohibit certain conduct and practices in trade, to provide for the disclosure of 
consumer information relating to the supply of goods and services and to promote 
product safety and also to repeal the Consumer Information Act 1969 and certain other 
enactments. 
 
More generally, the Fair Trading Act is designed to prevent misleading and deceptive 
conduct in trade and to encourage conduct that improves consumer product and service 
information and safety. 
 
The Fair Trading Act is divided into parts.   The first three parts constitute the substantive 
provisions of the Act.   Part I deals with misleading and deceptive conduct, false 
representations, and unfair practices.   Part II deals with consumer information.   Parts III 
and IV deal with the safety of products and services.   The obligations created in these 
parts are non-specific and, as a consequence, leave considerable room for judicial 
discretion in applying the Act to different circumstances.   The Fair Trading Act also 
imposes strict liability in respect of most of these obligations.   Apart from the section 44 
defences, which can be activated on the grounds of “reasonableness”, sentencing is the 
only area in the Act in which fault, or absence thereof, can be recognised. 
 
Part V deals with enforcement and remedies.   The Act creates both criminal and civil 
obligations.   Criminal obligations are created explicitly in section 40 of the Act and can 
be enforced by any person or organisation with the money and the inclination.    
(Remedies available under section 43 of the Act are intended to alleviate some the 
financial constraints of bringing a criminal prosecution.)   Civil obligations are not 
created explicitly, but the Act does provide additional civil remedies.   These are 
available on application to any person or organisation pursuing civil action, except where 
the remedy sought is a section 42 order to disclose information or publish corrective 
advertising, in which case it is available only to the Commerce Commission. 
 
The Commerce Commission has not only an enforcement role, but also an educational 
role as specified in section 6 of the Act.   Only the enforcement role is relevant in this 
study and this role will be explored further in the next section. 
 
 
B. Background 
 
The Fair Trading Bill was copied almost verbatim from part V of the Australian Trade 
Practices Act 1974.   The government’s CER (Closer Economic Relations) policy 
accounts for much of the decision to follow Australian, rather than equivalent UK, 
8 
legislation.4   The fact that Labour Governments were in power in both New Zealand and 
Australia at this time was undoubtedly another important factor.   The Selling Practices 
Act, the proposed predecessor to the Fair Trading Act, which was recommended in 1980 
under the National Government, was clearly akin to the UK regime. 5 
 
The duplication was unquestionably a cost-saving measure. The government was able to 
save time and money in the drafting process, and New Zealand benefited enormously 
from the substantial body of Australian precedent, including sentencing precedent.   
Unfortunately, the duplication cloaks much of the policy behind the Act.   In particular, 
there is no indication as to why the maximum fine for individuals was increased from the 
$20,000 stipulated in the Trade Practices Act to $30,000 in the Fair Trading Act.   The 
introduction of the Commerce Act in the same year further obscures the policy rationale 
behind the Fair Trading Act.   Significant parts of the Commerce Act 1986 were also 
adapted from the Trade Practices Act.   It is interesting, however, that while the Trade 
Practices Act was the archetype for both the Fair Trading and the Commerce Acts, New 
Zealand chose to introduce two separate pieces of legislation.6 
 
The Fair Trading Act was a product of two separate bills: the Fair Trading Bill and the 
Product Safety Bill.   This explains the two seemingly distinct functions of the Fair 
Trading Act: firstly, to create part of the infrastructure necessary to underpin the dramatic 
market reforms in the 1980s; and secondly, to consolidate and extend existing consumer 
protection legislation.   The two bills were ultimately combined in the House because 
they had “identical administrative provisions”. 
 
The Fair Trading Act as market reform legislation 
 
The market reforms in New Zealand in the 1980s were, in part, a response to the heavy 
regulation of the economy in earlier decades.   The reforms were based on the proposition 
that efficiency and equity concerns could be separated, and that the market achieves 
greater economic efficiency from open competition7 with minimal or no barriers to 
entry.8   The availability of information and the reputation of traders supported by 
contract law were important foundations for the efficient working of markets.   The Fair 
Trading Act was designed to improve the credibility (i.e. accuracy) of information flows.    
 
The Fair Trading Act presupposes the potential for the market to fail to provide credible 
information.   This is evidenced by the fact that the Act does not require that market 
failure be proved, a feature that it shares with its Australian counterpart.   The 
presumption of some market failure is inherent in the Trade Practices Act 1974.   In 
contrast, the presumption inherent in the United Kingdom’s Trade Descriptions Act 1968 
                                                
4 Fair Trading Bill 1985: Explanatory Booklet, (Department of Trade and Industry, November 1985,) p. 4. 
5 Proposals for a Selling Practices Act: Report of the Ministerial Working Party Reviewing Certain Consumer and Commercial 
Legislation, (Department of Trade and Industry, Wellington, July 1980,) p. 1. 
6 A possible explanation is that one of the perceived deficiencies of the Commerce Act 1975 was that it dealt with too many purposes, 
including consumer protection.   See: The Commerce Bill 1985: A Background to the Bill and an Outline of its Provisions, 
(Department of Trade and Industry, Wellington, August 1985,) p. 11. 
7 An efficient market is one that ensures that resources are accurately allocated to their most valued uses. 
8 See: Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson, and Teece (1996). 
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is that the market provides the ‘first best’ solution to consumer information problems.   
Market failure must be proved before intervention is considered.9 
 
The question of market failure, therefore, should not be an explicit consideration in 
adjudicating under the Act.   The presumption of some market failure is a policy 
consideration.   This does not mean that Judges cannot consider the effects of a breach on 
the market.   In fact, section 19 of the Act, which deals with bait advertising, explicitly 
requires that regard be given to the nature of the market.   It is difficult to conceive how 
the Act would achieve its purpose (of ameliorating market failure) if no regard is given to 
the effects of a breach on the market. 
 
The Fair Trading Act is concerned with identifying whether there was a breach and the 
type or scale of the breach, not why there was a breach. 
 
The Fair Trading Act as consumer protection legislation 
 
The Fair Trading Act protects consumers by making it an offence for traders to mislead 
or deceive consumers in such a way as to cause them, or risk causing them, financial or 
physical harm, or to erode their freedom of choice.   The Act provides a powerful 
bargaining platform from which consumers who are misled or deceived can seek redress.   
Through the Commerce Commission, the Act also provides a means of redress for 
consumers who would otherwise not be willing or able to incur the cost of litigation.   In 
this respect, the Act mitigates the need for class action. 
 
The Commission, however, goes further than this.  One of its stated roles is to seek 
clarification of the Fair Trading Act and take proactive cases where there is no 
complainant. 
 
C. Interpretation of the Act 
 
The dual functions of the Fair Trading Act, in underpinning market reform and promoting 
consumer protection, may exploit some communality.   Consumer protection is an 
obvious result of legislation designed to improve the accuracy of market information.   
Similarly, a more informed market may be a result of legislation designed to protect 
consumers. 
 
The integration of the Product Safety Bill with the Fair Trading Bill, however, highlights 
a potential interpretation issue in the resultant Fair Trading Act.   The Product Safety Bill 
was clearly a piece of legislation designed to protect consumers.   The Fair Trading Bill, 
on the other hand, was a piece of legislation designed to facilitate market reforms.   As 
already suggested, these two functions arguably are consistent in that they ensure the 
provision of more accurate consumer information.   The nature of what is being 
protected, however, is quite different.   The product safety provisions are concerned with 
protecting the physical well being of consumers.   The rest of the Act is concerned with 
                                                
9 See Proposals for a Selling Practices Act: Report of the Ministerial Working Party Reviewing Certain Consumer and Commercial 
Legislation, (Department of Trade and Industry, Wellington, July 1980.) 
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the protection of consumers’ financial interests and freedom of choice.   Actions that 
harm consumers in a physical sense, or risk harm to them, traditionally attract a great deal 
more public censure than actions that, for example, fail to disclose all the conditions of an 
offer in an advertisement.   Such values might affect the interpretation of the Act, 
particularly in relation to the size of penalties.   Breaches of the product safety provisions 
can be expected to incur considerably higher penalties than breaches of the other 
provisions in the Act, even if the breach to consumer information is greater in the latter.   
This disparity is likely to be greater if the importance of consumer protection 
overshadows the importance of a more informed market.   This was invariably the case in 
the early stages of the Act, as evidenced by the statement of Grieg J: 
 
In my view, the more substantial fines are to be reserved for repeated offenders, 
for deliberate breaches, particularly if done for commercial gain, and cases where 
there is widespread and large-scale breach with a real risk of damage or injury to 
consumers. 10  (Emphasis added.) 
 
 
 
                                                
10 LD Nathans v Commerce Commission (1988) 3 TCLR 362. 
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III. THE COMMERCE COMMISSION 
 
The role of the primary enforcer of the Fair Trading Act has been made the responsibility 
of the Commerce Commission.   A brief discussion of the Commission’s decision-
making process, illustrated below, provides sufficient context to extend conceptually the 
general theory of optimal penalties to a discussion of optimal sentencing, under the Fair 
Trading Act, in the next section.   The theory of optimal penalties makes some general 
assumptions about the dynamics of crime prevention, which are not necessarily 
representative of the judicial decisions that have been made in the enforcement of the Fair 
Trading Act. 
 
The Fair Trading Division of the Commerce Commission is responsible for the public 
enforcement of the Fair Trading Act.   This involves receiving and (potentially) acting on 
complaints, investigating potential breaches of the Act and educating potential offenders, 
and traders generally, about their obligations under the Act through the Regional Visit 
Programme, publications, seminars, and consultation. 
 
The Legal Division of the Commerce Commission is responsible for the prosecution of 
breaches of the Act, on behalf of the Commission.   (The decision to prosecute, however, 
rests with the Commissioner, not staff.)   Under the Act, the Commission has the power 
to take both criminal and civil action on behalf of others.  The Commission can also take 
pro-active criminal action where there is no complainant.  To this end, the Commission 
undertakes surveillance on a mix of issues and industries.   
 
Although the Commerce Commission receives thousands of complaints and enquiries 
from consumers and traders every year, it has sufficient resources to pursue only a 
handful of these cases.   To process the complaints and enquiries, and to determine which 
merit further action, the Commission has developed working investigation and 
enforcement criteria. 
 
Complaints and enquires received by the Commission are filtered initially according to 
whether there appears to be a prima facie breach of the Act.   If a prima facie breach 
exists, each complaint is assessed against the investigation criteria.   This involves a 
subjective assessment of whether there exists a “major market problem”, blatant 
disregard for the law, or an opportunity for setting or amending a precedent.   If one of 
these criteria is met, an interim assessment is made as to whether it is appropriate for the 
Commission to investigate.  An investigation will generally proceed where the prima 
facie breach is of an area of the Act that the Commission has identified as a problem.   
Should the investigation find sufficient evidence of a breach, the question of enforcement 
is addressed.   By this stage, it is unusual for the Commission to decide not to pursue a 
case further.   The enforcement criteria are used to work out the appropriate method of 
enforcement.   If the breach is not deliberate and is reasonably insignificant, a warning is 
given.   If there is sufficient evidence to prove a breach, and a real change to the trader’s 
conduct would be effected through court action, court action will be pursued in 
accordance with the Act.   The particular remedies under the Act also influence the 
decision to take court action.   If a better outcome would be achieved out of court, 
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settlement is usually sought.   If settlement involves an undertaking, Commission 
approval must be given. 
 
It would be interesting from a law and economics perspective to assess the optimality of 
these decision-making processes.   This, however, would require a quantitative 
assessment similar to that being undertaken in this study for judicial sentencing under the 
Fair Trading Act.   Such an assessment is beyond the scope of this study. 
 
The Decision-Making Process of the Commerce Commission with  
Fair Trading Act Issues, June Year 1997/9811 
 
 
 
 
  14,718 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
   511 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    218 68 24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
11 Source: Commerce Commission Annual Report 1997 – 1998.    See appendix A for details on the decision-making criteria. 
Complaints and Enquires 
 
Prima facie breach of the Act 
 
It is appropriate and/or possible for the 
Commission to investigate 
 
Satisfies at least one of the three 
Investigation Criteria 
 
 
Evidence of Breach 
 
Investigation 
 
Enforcement Criteria satisfied 
 
Warning 
 
Settlement 
 
Court Action 
 
Commission 
Settlement 
Staff Settlement 
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IV. THE THEORY OF OPTIMAL JUDICIAL SENTENCING 
 
A law and economics approach is used to explain the variation in the size of penalties 
imposed in different cases under the Fair Trading Act.   Law and economics uses the 
‘economic approach’ to explain legal behaviour.   The ‘economic approach’ holds that 
individuals are instrumental rationalists: they make their decisions by weighing the 
respective costs and benefits of their proposed action.   In using this approach, the 
assumption is implicitly made that judges are rational economic decision-makers.   This 
means that in awarding fines, judges only seek to take into account those factors that have 
a bearing on the maximisation of net social welfare.12 
 
Legislative maxima are placed on fines under the Fair Trading Act: $30,000 in respect of 
individuals, and $100,000 in respect of bodies corporate.   A maximum fine has never 
been awarded under the Fair Trading Act to date.13   Fines have always been less than 
$30,000 and $100,000, and are less than the maximal fines anticipated by the Act.   The 
use of the word “maximum” in section 40 provides a clear indication that the legislature 
intended maximum fines to be reserved for the most serious breaches of the Act.   
However, there are no considerations provided in the Act to indicate what does or does 
not constitute a serious breach.   Consequently, the award of a less than maximal fine 
presupposes the existence of judge-made considerations, which in turn invites an inquiry 
as to the explanation of why such a fine was awarded.   Because of the common law 
doctrine of precedent, we expect that such an explanation is articulately consistent.   On 
face value, we cannot actually tell whether the explanation is articulately consistent.   
However, this can be tested by estimating a model that allows an investigation of the 
systematic determinants of the sizes of fines. 
 
No work (as far as I am aware) has been done on the optimality of judicial sentencing.   
However, work of a more general nature has been done on optimal penalties for 
individuals under the theory of optimal penalties.14 
 
The economic model tested in this study is based on the theory of optimal penalties, but 
extended to recognise the distinction between legislation and judicial decision-making.   
Legislative decision-making concerns the creation of a penalty-process that applies to 
everyone.    Judicial decision-making, on the other hand, concerns the application of that 
process to individuals.   However, depending on the degree of discretion the legislature 
allows the judiciary, many of the considerations relevant in determining the optimal 
penalty are also relevant in applying them.   The theory of optimal penalties provides a 
guide as to what variables are relevant considerations in achieving an optimal penalty.   
To this extent, the theory of optimal penalties provides a valuable framework for the 
study. 
 
 
                                                
12 Although efficiency is not an explicit objective of the Act, it is consistent with the objectives of the Act discussed in section II of 
this paper. 
13 31 December 1998. 
14 The theory of optimal penalties is also known as the law and economics of penalties and the theory of optimal law enforcement.   
The phrase “optimal theory of penalties” is attributable to Gary Becker (1968). 
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A. The Theory of Optimal Penalties 
 
The theory of optimal penalties originates from Gary Becker’s paper on Crime and 
Punishment published in 1968.   Becker used an economic approach to explain behaviour 
inherent in the criminal justice system.   The economic approach holds that individuals 
are instrumentally rational, in that they make decisions by weighing the respective costs 
and benefits of alternative courses of action.   Under this approach, the concept of justice 
is treated as being one of economic efficiency: maximisation of the social planner’s 
objective function subject to individuals’ decisions to commit crime.15    
 
The theory of optimal penalties is an application to the area of criminal law of the 
economic theories of utility maximisation and externalities.   Both criminals and social 
planners are assumed to be rational economic agents.   Accordingly, criminals maximise 
their expected utility (EU) while social planners maximise social welfare (W), which is 
the sum of the utility functions of all individuals making up society.   The criminal does 
not observe the cost of detection and conviction in formulating his or her probability of 
being detected and convicted, or the severity of punishment.   Similarly, the social 
planner does not observe the benefit to the offender or the harm to society of criminal 
activity.    
 
Mathematically, the expected utility to the criminal (EU) is a function of the probability 
that he or she will be detected and convicted (p), the benefit of the criminal activity (b) 
and the severity of the punishment (f):  
 
 EU = pU(b – f) + (1 – p)U(b),  
 
where b is the criminal’s income if not caught, and (b – f) is the criminal’s income if he 
or she is caught.    
 
Social welfare (W), on the other hand, is a function of the benefit to the criminal of the 
criminal activity (b), the harm to society of the criminal activity (h), and the cost to 
society of detection and conviction (c):  
 
 W = (b – h) – c. 
 
The theory of optimal penalties aims to find the level of social resources necessary to 
reduce the level of criminal activity to that which maximises social welfare.   The theory 
recognises that social welfare is unlikely to be maximised where criminal activity is 
completely eliminated.   At some level of criminal activity, the value of the additional 
resources necessary to deter the remaining criminal activity is likely to exceed the value 
of having that criminal activity deterred. 
 
Social resources are absorbed in the prevention of criminal activity, according to the 
theory, in two principal ways: detection and conviction, and punishment.   The policy 
instruments used to deter criminals, therefore, are either to increase the probability of 
                                                
15 Garoupa (1997) p 268.    
15 
detection and conviction, p(c), or to increase the severity of punishment, p(f).   
Punishment may involve, amongst other things, the levying of fines, imprisonment, 
periodic detention, community service, or rehabilitation.   These are the “penalties” that 
are described in the optimal penalty literature.  
 
An important premise of the theory of optimal penalties is that criminal activity may be 
socially valuable.   Gains and costs to an individual associated with undertaking a 
criminal act are interpreted as gains and costs to society.   Hence the model of optimal 
penalties abstracts from the morality of criminal activity.   This has important 
implications for the application of the model to the Fair Trading Act.   The model does 
not accommodate morality, and therefore, does not consider any associated social stigma 
attached to criminal acts that physically harm or risk harming individuals.   If judges 
attach weight to this stigma in sentencing, they effectively take into account (in the 
model’s terms) a non-optimal consideration,16 and the model will thus be imperfect in 
explaining the variation in the size of penalties. 
 
According to Becker: 
 
Whether “crime pays” is ….. an implication of the attitudes offenders have towards 
risk and is not directly related to the efficiency of the police or the amount spent on 
combating crime ….. the social loss from illegal activities is usually minimised by 
selecting [the probability and severity of punishment] in regions where risk is 
preferred, that is, in regions where “crime does not pay.”17 
 
Provided offenders are averse to risk, there is a negative correlation between the amount 
of social resources allocated to preventing crime and the level of criminal activity: the 
more resources allocated, the more crime is deterred.   The marginal deterrence of 
increased resources (the probability and severity of punishment), however, is 
diminishing.   Optimal crime (and punishment) requires that the marginal cost of 
increasing the level of crime equals the marginal benefit generated by the increased crime 
itself.   The optimal punishment, therefore, is equal to the cost of the marginal harm done 
to society.18 
 
Becker’s more controversial result (as demonstrated by Nuno Garoupa (1997)) is that 
“social welfare is increased if fines are used wherever possible”.19 Becker’s reasoning is 
that fines represent costless transfers between members of society whereas other penalties 
do not. 
 
The total social cost of punishment is the cost to offenders plus the cost or minus 
the gain to others.   Fines produce a gain to the latter that equals the cost to 
offenders, aside from collection costs, and so the social cost of fines is about zero 
                                                
16 The model may take into account reputation.   Arguably, this is an important source of morality.   Thus, this leads to behavioural 
rules that society takes as having basis in morality.   If this completely encapsulates the stigma, then taking reputation into account 
may not be “non-optimal”. 
17 Becker (1968) p. 179. 
18 Becker (1968) p. 192. 
19 Becker (1968) p. 193. 
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….. The social cost of .…. other punishments, however, generally exceeds that to 
offenders, because others are also hurt.20 
 
The principal results of Becker’s model, as Garoupa sees them, are that increases in the 
probability and severity of punishment deter crime, and that fines are the preferred form 
of punishment as they represent costless transfers, while other forms of punishment do 
not.   A further result that Garoupa extracts is that the optimal fine should be the 
maximum fine.   The maximum fine that can be imposed is equivalent to the entire wealth 
of the individual criminal (F).   From the assumption that fines represent costless 
transfers, it follows that no cost is associated with increasing the level of the fine.   The 
optimal level of the fine is, therefore, the maximum fine because we know, from Becker, 
that increasing the severity of punishment (in this case the level of the fine) has a 
positive, albeit diminishing, effect of the level of criminal activity. 
 
Garoupa surveys each of the major qualifications to Becker’s model suggested by others 
in light of how they modify the result that the maximum fine is the optimal fine.   It is his 
results that are used to formulate a model that may help to explain the variation in the 
sizes of penalties under the Fair Trading Act.  
 
Polinsky and Shavell have been major contributors to the literature that Garoupa has 
surveyed.   In their most recent contribution, Polinsky and Shavell (2000) have expanded 
on the qualifications to Becker’s model.    
 
Some adjustments need to be made to the basic theory, however, to accommodate judicial 
sentencing under the Fair Trading Act.   These are briefly outlined below and in more 
detail in section V following. 
 
 
B. The Theory of Optimal Judicial Sentencing and the Fair Trading 
Act 
 
The theory of optimal judicial sentencing is an extension of the theory of optimal 
penalties.   As mentioned earlier, this extension must recognise that legislative and 
judicial decision-making involve substantially similar considerations for substantially 
similar situations. 
 
The application of the theory of optimal penalties to sentencing under the Fair Trading 
Act is simplified by the fact that fines are the only penalty provided in the Act.21   For the 
                                                
20 Becker (1968) p. 180. 
21 SECTION 40 CONTRAVENTION OF PROVISIONS OF PART I, PART II, PART III, AND PART IV IS AN OFFENCE 
40(1)  [Fines]  Every person who contravenes any of the provision of Part I (except sections 9, 14(2), and 23), or Part II or Part III or 
Part IV of this Act, commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction –  
(a) In the case of a person other than a body corporate, to a fine not exceeding $30,000; and 
(b) In the case of a body corporate, to a fine not exceeding $100,000. 
40(2)  [Offences similar]  Where a person is convicted, whether in the same or separate proceedings, of 2 or more offences in respect 
of contraventions of the same provisions of this Act and those contraventions are of the same or a substantially similar nature and 
occurred at or about the same time, the aggregate amount of any fines imposed on that person in respect of those convictions shall not 
exceed the amount of the maximum fine that may be imposed in respect of a conviction for a single offence. 
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purposes of applying the theory to Fair Trading Act sentencing, the legislative maxima 
specified in section 40 of the Act are taken to be the maxima of the “maximal fines” (F) 
discussed by Garoupa.22   The variables in Becker’s model, in turn, represent basic 
“optimality considerations”.   Provided these are satisfied, the fine awarded should be the 
maximum fine.   The variation in the size of the fines under the Fair Trading Act, then, is 
caused by additional considerations, which may not be in accord with the economic 
approach.   However, according to Garoupa, the fine may still be “optimal” even though 
it is not the maximum fine, provided the variation is caused by any of the additional 
“optimality considerations” he surveys, which are not accommodated by Becker.23 
 
Unfortunately, an actual assessment of the optimality of the individual fines is outside the 
scope of this study.   Such an assessment would require an investigation into what 
actually represents an optimal fine in each of the circumstances in which a fine was 
imposed.   A similar investigation would be required to assess the optimality of the 
legislative maxima in section 40 of the Act.   This study can only tell us whether the 
“optimality considerations”, as hypothesised by Becker and others and synthesised by 
Garoupa, do in fact explain how the size of the penalties vary on average on the basis of 
relevant factors. 
 
If Garoupa’s “optimality considerations” do not adequately explain the variation in the 
size of penalties under the Fair Trading Act, then it can be concluded that judges are not 
awarding optimal penalties according to the theory of optimal judicial sentencing.   
Alternatively, it could be concluded that the theory is an inaccurate representation of 
judicial sentencing, in that it does not take into account all relevant considerations, or 
lack thereof, in sentencing. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
40(3)  [Limitation period]  Proceedings under this section may be commenced at any time within 3 years after the matter giving rise 
to the contravention arose. 
22 The “maximal fine” (F) that can be imposed is equivalent to the entire wealth of an individual.   In the context of the Act, $30,000 is 
assumed to represent the maximum wealth of a person who is not a body corporate, and $100,000 to represent the maximum wealth of 
a body corporate.   This is a strong assumption, but not a crucial one: the analysis in the study is of variation per se in the size of 
penalties awarded under the Act, not variation from the legislative maxima. 
23 Becker’s model is considerably more generalised than those that have followed, as it is based on a homogenous representative 
society.  
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V. THE MODEL OF OPTIMAL FAIR TRADING ACT 
SENTENCING 
 
In this section, an econometric model is developed to test the ability of the theory of 
optimal penalties to explain the variation in the size of average penalties under the Fair 
Trading Act. 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the theory is amenable to econometric analysis in 
the context of the Fair Trading Act because fines are the only penalty in the Act.   The 
maximum fines in the Act can be treated as if they were the “maximal fines” discussed by 
Garoupa in his synthesis of the theory of optimal penalties. 
 
By way of introduction, a standard econometric model is specified initially.   The 
variables in the model are then introduced and explained.   Because the data were 
collected before the theory was considered, two variants of the econometric model are 
examined: an unrestricted variable model and a restricted variable model.   The 
unrestricted model includes all the variables that were collected for the study.   The 
restricted model includes mainly those variables that approximate the “optimality 
considerations” in the theory of optimal penalties.   Following this, the data and the 
estimation procedure are discussed briefly. 
 
 
A. Econometric Regression Model 
 
A linear, single equation, multiple variable regression model is used for the econometric 
analysis.   This model is of the form: 
 
 yi = αi + β1x1i + β2x2i + .....+ βkxki + µi 
 
where: y is the penalty, 
x is an explanatory variable, 
k is the number of variables, 
i = 1,..., n, and n is the number of observations, 
α is the constant or intercept, 
β is the coefficient of X, the variation in the size of penalties explained by the 
model or set of explanatory variables, 
and µ is the error term, which is the variation in the size of penalties not 
explained by the model or set of explanatory variables. 
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B. Explanatory Variables 
 
A description of all of the explanatory variables quantified for the study is provided in 
Table 1.   These explanatory variables were chosen without reference to economic theory.   
Instead, they represent the sentencing criteria developed by New Zealand Courts since the 
Fair Trading Act came into force on 1 March 1997, as well as the basic details about each 
case.24    
 
Table 1 
Specification of Explanatory Variables 
 
Aggregate penalty The total penalty imposed in each case against the defendant.  The variable does not include 
compensation, witness and evidentiary expenses, court costs or legal fees. 
Penalty per 
information/charge 
The penalties, in each case against the defendant, imposed against individual informations.   An 
information is an official allegation by the Commission (the informant) against an individual or 
company (the defendant) of a breach of a section of the Act.   A separate information is filed for 
every section allegedly breached and for every individual or person. 
Type of defendant The type of defendant convicted: individual or body corporate. 
Section The section of the Fair Trading Act 1986 that was allegedly breached. 
Informations per section The number of informations alleging breaches of particular sections of the Act.    
Number of informations The number of informations which resulted in convictions.   Not all convictions receive 
sentences.   In respect of some convictions the defendant may be discharged.   Alternatively, the 
judge may award a total fine and not apportion it between the relevant informations. 
Date The date of the decision, not of sentencing.   In some cases the dates are the same.   Decision 
dates are more reliable and comprehensive than sentencing dates. 
Court District Court, High Court or Court of Appeal. 
CPI Consumer Price Index 
City The city the court resided in during the hearing. 
Judge The judge who adjudicated and sentenced in the case. 
Intent This variable attempts to capture the mindset of the defendant or motivation for the breach.   
‘Intent’ constitutes one of the following: an act that the defendant knew he or she was doing, an 
act that the defendant did to make a profit, or an act the defendant did with the Fair Trading Act 
in mind. 
Negligence Negligence is the failure of the defendant to take adequate steps to prevent a breach of the Act.    
Freedom of choice prejudice A breach that influences consumer behavior. 
Financial prejudice A breach to the financial detriment of consumers. 
Safety prejudice A breach that threatens safety or risks physically or mentally injuring consumers. 
Physical harm prejudice A breach that actually harms consumers, physically or mentally. 
Producer harm prejudice Financial detriment to competitors.   Usually indirect harm in terms of lost sales. 
Efforts to correct breach Steps taken to prevent future breaches and/or negate the effect of the breach.   Such steps could 
include the implementation of compliance programmes, corrective advertising and offers to 
repurchase any goods sold as a result of the breach.   The speed with which such measures are put 
into practice is also likely to be a factor taken into account by the courts.   (Ex post) 
Deterrence The anticipated increase in compliance with the Act, principally by competitors, following the 
imposition of a penalty.    
Incidental profit The profit earned exclusively from the breach, over and above what would have been earned 
without the breach. 
Maximum fine Whether the maximum fine is taken into account by the judge in sentencing. 
Ability to pay The financial position of the defendant. 
Plea Guilty or not guilty.   Evidence of remorse. 
Previous offences Previous offences against the Act.   Includes warnings, settlements, and convictions.   Does not 
include prosecutions against the defendant that have been dismissed. 
Cooperation with Commission The degree to which the defendant assisted the Commission with its inquiries.   Includes ex-ante 
efforts to prevent breaches of the Act – particularly in light of the Commission's pro-active 
enforcement practice.   Evidence of remorse.   (Ex ante) 
Degree of dissemination The number of consumers potentially, not necessarily actually, affected by the breach.   Implicitly 
takes into account the target consumer audience, i.e., distinguishes between 'consumers' and 
'people'.   For example, while 10,000 people may have seen a misleading advertisement for sheep 
flea control, only 1,000 or so people would ever be interested in purchasing the product.    To this 
                                                
24 See Appendix B for more details about data collection, and Appendix C for the legal and economic relevance of each of the 
variables, their expected correlation with the size of the penalty, and details about their quantification. 
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extent, the degree of dissemination, in terms of the number of people, is great, but in terms of 
potential customers, it is not.   The latter is what is measured by this variable. 
Market The product the defendant sells.   (While this does not necessarily define the ‘market’ that the 
defendant operates in, it is the best approximation given the details provided in the cases.)  
Market share The share of the product the defendant sells in the New Zealand domestic market (locally or 
nationally.) 
Penalty submissions relied 
upon 
The Commission has adopted a standard penalty submission to help the Court determine 
sentence.   The submission synthesises the relevant precedent on sentencing with presumably a 
slight bias towards the Commission’s preferred outcome.   While the judge will take penalty 
submissions into account, he or she may or may not let it dictate their decision. 
Influence of others The defendant may not have been solely responsible for the breach. 
Pre-sentencing prejudicial 
behavior towards defendant 
Actions by the Commission before judgment that have the potential to prejudice the defendant.   
For example, the early media release by the Commission regarding the Bond & Bond case in 
1996. 
Public status Extent of public influence or control created by reputation. 
Other sanctions  Other costs associated with the prosecution including compensation, court costs, legal fees, 
witness expenses, and evidentiary costs.  
Origin of complaint Consumer, competitive trader, or the Commerce Commission (proactive prosecution only). 
Extent of departure from truth The extent to which the breach represents a departure from the truth.   It ranges from literal truth, 
through non-disclosure, to falsity.   In cases where the defendant is convicted of false 
representation, it is trite. 
Extent of breach The incidence of the breach. 
 
 
Unrestricted Model 
 
The unrestricted model includes most of the variables that were quantified for the study.   
A number of the variables were omitted from analysis because of inadequacies in the data 
quantification and the consistency of information provided in the cases, or because they 
represented outliers.25    No integrating economic theory underlies the selection of these 
explanatory variables. 
 
                                                
25 Details on the variables that were omitted, and why they were omitted is given in Appendix B. 
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Restricted Model 
 
The explanatory variables in the restricted model are selected from Garoupa’s synthesis 
of the theory of optimal penalties.26   As explained in the previous section, although the 
theory of optimal penalties is not explicitly a theory of judicial sentencing, considerations 
relevant to determining the optimal size of the penalty are relevant to sentencing, 
provided sentencing involves some decision as to the size of the penalty.    
 
Garoupa’s synthesised model of optimal penalties can be summarised as follows: 
 
The social planner maximises social welfare [W = (b – h) – c] subject to criminals 
maximising their expected utility [EU = pU(b – f) + (1 – p)U(b)]. 
 
The basic (Becker) variables, or “optimality considerations”, are: 
 
p - probability of detection and conviction 
b - benefit to the offender of criminal activity 
f - severity of punishment 
h - harm to society of criminal activity 
c - cost to society of detection and conviction 
 
Relevant additional (non-Becker) variables, also “optimality considerations”, are: 
 
w - wealth variations among individuals 
θ - individual characteristics of the offender that help the offender to avoid 
detection 
ϕ - repeat offenders 
F - maximum fine 
 
Some of these variables (optimality considerations) are approximated by factors that 
judges appear to take into account in sentencing under the Fair Trading Act, and these are 
listed in Table 2.   A specific data quantification technique was used to convert some of 
the raw data into useful variables, as explained in Appendix B.  Optimality considerations 
that are not adequately approximated by the data are omitted.   Likewise, data that do not 
comfortably fall into the optimality considerations are omitted from analysis, apart from 
certain “non-optimality considerations” whose omission would render the model 
statistically insignificant. 
 
The resulting restricted model variables are given in Table 2.27 
 
                                                
26 Garoupa (1968) pp.267-295. 
27 See Appendix D for details. 
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Table 2 
Restricted Model Variables 
 
Optimality 
considerations 
Approximating variables 
p None 
b Incidental profit 
 Effort to correct breach 
f Aggregate penalty 
h Prejudice to consumers’ freedom of choice 
 Financial prejudice to consumers 
 Safety prejudice to consumers 
 Financial prejudice to producers 
c Guilty plea 
 Cooperation with Commerce Commission 
w Ability to pay 
θ Intent 
ϕ Previous offences 
F Type of defendant 
Non-optimality 
considerations 
 
 Number of informations 
 CPI 
 
The restricted model specified below uses all of the explanatory variables listed in Table 
2.   The choice of these particular explanatory variables is dictated both by economic 
theory and by econometric considerations.    
 
The full or unrestricted model is estimated first, followed by the restricted model.   By 
comparing the models’ statistics, the restrictions (i.e. the variables excluded from the 
restricted model) are accepted using a joint significance test with 5% significance.28   
This means that, jointly, the omitted variables do not (statistically) significantly explain 
variation in the size of the penalty to a degree great enough to warrant their inclusion.   
Further linear restrictions were considered but were not adopted.29   The linear 
restrictions were designed to isolate the effects of groups of the variables in Table 2. 
 
                                                
28 See Shazam results, Appendix F. 
29 See Appendix D and Appendix F for linear restrictions. 
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C. Data 
 
84 out of about 130 Fair Trading Act cases with sentencing remarks were quantified for 
the study.   No selection was involved in the quantification of the cases; the omissions are 
due primarily to availability of the sentencing remarks.30  
 
D. Estimation 
 
Econometric estimation involves estimating the unknown parameters α and β in the 
econometric regression model specified above. The intercept, or constant, term is α and 
the β are the slope parameters, or the regression coefficients.   The regression coefficients 
are of particular interest because they tell us the variation in the dependent variable, 
penalty, caused by a unit variation in each of the relevant explanatory variables. 
 
Tobit is used to estimate the model because the dependent variable, penalty, is bounded 
below by zero.   In our model, the limit is zero because only penalties greater than or 
equal to zero are observed.   Tobit assumes that the error terms are normally distributed 
and, given this, properly accounts for the zero lower limit. Had there been fines at the 
legislated upper limit this feature would have had to have been accounted for in a similar 
way.   Out of the 84 observations in the study, there are 4 lower-limit observations and 80 
non-limit observations. 
 
 
 
                                                
30 More information on the data is included in Appendix B. 
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VI. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
 
A. Results 
 
Shazam (version 7), an econometrics computer programme, was used to generate the 
econometric results for this study. 
 
Table 3 displays the results for the unrestricted and the restricted regressions.31   The 
results for the latter are of particular interest.   The restricted model incorporates the 
economic theory of judicial sentencing, and therefore tests the economic explanation of 
what determines the size of penalties under the Fair Trading Act. If the unrestricted 
model has no more explanatory power than the restricted model, the economic basis of 
the restricted model is supported by the data. 
 
Table 3 
Econometric Results for the unrestricted and restricted regressions 
 
 Unrestricted 
Model 
Restricted 
Model 
   
# Observations 84 84 
# Explanatory variables 27 14 
Degrees of freedom including constant 56 69 
Degrees of freedom excluding constant 57 70 
   
# Limit Observations 4 4 
# Non-limit observations 80 80 
   
Variance of the estimate (σ2) 137120000 166570000 
Standard error of the estimate (σ) 11710 12906 
   
The predicted probability of Y > limit given average X(I) .8013 0.7788 
The observed frequency of Y > limit .9524 0.9524 
At mean values of all X(I), E(Y) 11207.0781 11554.3757 
   
Log-likelihood function -865.30951 -873.41822 
Mean-square error 119692580 150487000 
Mean error 2419.1570 2551.9376 
Squared correlation between observed and expected values .66315 0.56685 
   
   
Constant -8452500 -81237 
 (-1.3754) (-3.4982) 
Type of Defendant (Dummy) 3458.2 5638.9 
 (0.93261) (1.4686) 
Number of Informations 947.24 1107.4 
 (3.0662) (3.8088) 
Date 4273.7  
 (1.3611)  
CPI -75.118 75.272 
 (-0.64747) (3.1395) 
Court -4943.2  
 (-0.90469)  
                                                
31 See Appendix F for complete Shazam results. 
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City (Christchurch Dummy) 4122.3  
 (1.1522)  
Intent 5466 6002 
 (2.6264) (3.5663) 
Negligence 2023.5  
 (0.97039)  
Freedom of Choice Prejudice 922.67 114.46 
 (0.32859) (0.05369) 
Financial Prejudice -4555.1 -3265.2 
 (-1.9341) (-1.5713) 
Safety Prejudice 669.97 1776.8 
 (0.21627) (0.67967) 
Producer Harm Prejudice -473.76 -122.44 
 (-0.20752) (0.065799) 
Efforts to Correct the Breach 1135.7 2711.7 
 (0.57714) (1.6403) 
Incidental Profit 2546.1 2123.9 
 (1.3283) (1.1179) 
Maximum Fine 3270.5  
 (0.96311)  
Ability to Pay 3032.9 4182.4 
 (1.227) (1.9411) 
Guilty Plea -2181.1 -2372.2 
 (-0.70161) (-0.75379) 
Previous Offences -10057 -10695 
 (-2.1349) (-2.3285) 
Cooperation with Commission -2548 -2996.8 
 (-1.457) (-1.7867) 
Degree of Dissemination -2039.5  
 (-0.87194)  
Market Share -1077  
 (0.22285)  
Penalty Submissions Relied Upon 3792.6  
 (0.97829)  
Influence of Others 3389.4  
 (0.97474)  
Public Status -301.25  
 (0.25035)  
Other Sanctions -1956.1  
 (-0.53032)  
Extent of Departure from Truth 2817.8  
 (1.0874)  
Extent of Breach -1124.7  
 (-0.73441)  
 
 
B. Interpretation 
 
Shazam generates both normalised coefficients (β/σ) and regression coefficients (β).   
The normalised coefficients are estimated using Tobit and the regression coefficients are 
calibrated by multiplying the normalised coefficients by the estimate of σ.   It is the 
regression coefficients that allow interpretation of the results recorded in Table 3 in terms 
of the econometric regression model outlined in the previous section. 
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Shazam Statistics 
 
Shazam generates a number of useful statistics for the Tobit regression: the variance of 
the estimate (σ2); the standard error of the estimate (σ); the predicted probability of Y > 
limit given average X(I); the observed frequency of Y > limit; the mean-square error and 
mean error; and the squared correlation between observed and expected values.   Each of 
these is recorded in the chart above and will be explained in terms of the restricted 
econometric regression model and the results in Table 3. 
 
The variance of the estimate (σ2) and the standard error of the estimate (σ) are the 
variance and standard deviation of µ, the error term.   The standard error of the estimate, 
which is the square root of the variance, is easier to interpret.   In the restricted model, the 
standard error of the estimate is 14,148.   This indicates that the estimated penalty varies 
by $14,148.00, on average, from its mean.   The mean of the estimated penalty is given 
by the statistic E(Y), at mean values of all X(I).   In the restricted model this is 
$11,554.38.   The estimated penalty, therefore, varies quite significantly from its average 
value. 
 
The predicted probability of Y > limit given average X(I) and the observed frequency of 
Y > limit are self explanatory, given that the limit is zero.   In the restricted model, the 
observed frequency of the penalty being greater than $0.00 is 95.2%.   This is simply the 
probability that 80 out of the 84 observations have penalties greater than zero.   The fact 
that the predicted probability is only 77.9% indicates the effect of censoring on the 
explanatory variables.   The difference is either a reference to the non-linear nature of the 
true or underlying model, or the fact that there is more dispersion in X, the set of 
explanatory variables, about its mean in the predicted model. 
 
The mean error and squared correlation give some measure of the ‘fit’ of the model to the 
data.   Unfortunately, Tobit does not give a convenient measure of the goodness of fit. 
 
The mean square error and the mean error tell us the variation of the estimated penalty 
values from the observed data.   As with the standard error of the estimate, the mean error 
is easier to interpret.   In the restricted model, the mean error is 2551.9376.   This tells us 
that the estimated penalty varies, on average, by $2551.94 from the actual observations of 
the penalty.   Ideally, we would want there to be no variation, although this is not a bad 
result. 
 
The squared correlation between the observed and expected, or predicted, values in the 
restricted model is 0.56685.   Given that perfect correlation is represented by the value 1, 
and that there is variation in the data, this result is also reasonable. 
 
Regression Coefficients 
 
The values, which correspond to each of the variables in Table 3, are the regression 
coefficients (βs) for each of those variables.   They are the slope parameters.   They tell 
us the variation in the aggregate penalty correlated with, or ‘caused’ by, a unit variation 
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in the variable the coefficient corresponds to.   For example, in the restricted model, a 
unit increase in ‘Intent’ yields a $6,002.00 increase in the size of the aggregate penalty.   
The units of ‘Intent’ are as follows: 0, no intent; 1, the defendant knew what he or she 
was doing; 2, the defendant not only knew what he or she was doing but did so with the 
view to profit; 3, the same for 2 except the defendant deliberately evaded the Fair Trading 
Act.   From the Commerce Commission’s point of view, this value would be useful in 
assessing the size of the penalty to be expected for a given value of the variable.   For 
example, if the Commission was able to prove to the judge that the defendant not only 
knew what he or she was doing but did so with the view to profit, they could expect this 
to increase the size of the penalty by around $12,000.00.   The accuracy of the regression 
coefficients, however, depends on the degree to which they vary for different 
observations.   This variation is measured by the standard error of the regression 
coefficient. 
 
Standard Errors of the Regression Coefficients 
 
Unfortunately, the standard errors of the coefficients in the Shazam output are of the 
normalised coefficients rather than the regression coefficients.   This means that their 
interpretation does not tell us anything about the variation of the regression coefficients.   
For this reason they are not included in the chart above.   They do, however, indicate 
which of the coefficients are significantly different from zero.   The t-statistics, therefore, 
are still relevant despite the fact that the standard errors of the normalised coefficients are 
used to calculate them. 
 
As with the standard error of the estimate, the standard error of the regression coefficient 
would usually tell us the average deviation of the coefficient about its mean.   The lower 
the standard error, the better.   High standard errors indicate that there is considerable 
variation in the value of the coefficient, and therefore in the accuracy of the variable in 
explaining movement in the aggregate penalty.   A high standard error erodes the 
predictability of the model. 
 
T-Statistics 
 
The t-statistics, which are recorded in brackets in table 3, tell us the individual 
significance of each of the variables in the regression.   A t-statistic that is significant 
indicates that the regression coefficient of a variable is sufficiently different from zero to 
explain some of the variation in the size of the dependent variable. 
 
In the unrestricted model, ‘Number of Informations’, ‘Intent’ and ‘Previous Offences’ 
are individually significant at a 5% level of significance.   This means that the probability 
of rejecting the null hypothesis, that any one of these variables does not individually 
explain variation in the aggregate penalty, when it is true, is less than 5%.   ‘Financial 
Prejudice to Consumers’ is also individually significant at 10% significance.   The 
model is jointly significant at a 5% level of significance.   This means that even though 
the other variables in the unrestricted model are not individually significant, as a block 
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they contribute to explaining the variation in the size of penalties.   To this extent, 
interpretation of all variables is relevant. 
 
In the restricted model, ‘Number of Informations’, ‘CPI’, ‘Intent’, and ‘Previous 
Offences’ are individually significant at 5% significance.   The ‘Ability to Pay’ and 
‘Cooperation with the Commission’ are also significant at 10% significance.   The 
model is also jointly significant at a 5% level of significance. 
 
Explanation of the Statistical Significance of the Restricted Model 
 
Each of the individually significant variables in the restricted model is explained in turn. 
 
‘Number of Informations’ 
 
The significance of the ‘Number of Informations’ is not surprising.  It could be 
hypothesised that the Commission uses the number of informations as a means of 
increasing the aggregate penalty requested.   The regression coefficient for this variable is 
positive, as expected.   It indicates that an increase in the number of informations by one 
information is correlated with a $1,107.40 increase in the size of the aggregate penalty.   
In terms of the theory of optimal judicial sentencing, however, the significance of this 
variable is less apparent.    
 
Even if the Commission uses informations to gain leverage over the size of the penalty, it 
is difficult to justify judicial acquiescence, albeit unconsciously, on the grounds of 
optimality.   It could be argued that the variable is interpreted by judges as a proxy for the 
extent of the breach: the larger the number of breaches, the larger the number of 
informations.   This is certainly supported by the fact that each information represents 
either a different fact situation, section of the Act, or defendant.   Whether or not the 
Commission’s use of informations in this manner supports such a systematic 
interpretation is questionable.   The Commission may choose to use one information as a 
representative breach or, alternatively, it may use as many informations as possible to 
guarantee a conviction or higher penalty.   To the extent that it does, however, the 
variable is in the class of optimal considerations. 
 
‘CPI’ 
 
The significance of the ‘CPI’ as an explanatory variable, and the fact that it has a positive 
coefficient, is also not surprising.  Over time one would expect that fines would be 
maintained in real terms and our fine data have not been adjusted for inflation.  There has 
clearly been an upward trend in the size of the aggregate fines since the Act came into 
force.   The statistical significance of the ‘CPI’ is evidence that this trend exists.   The 
size of the coefficient indicates that a 1% increase in the rate of inflation is correlated 
with a 4.96% increase in the real value of fines.   ‘CPI’, therefore, accounts for more than 
just the maintenance of the real value of fines; the variable must be capturing some other 
component of the time trend in the size of penalties under the Act.   It should be noted 
that ‘Date’ was not a significant explanatory variable, which suggests that ‘CPI’ may be 
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capturing some of the effect of this variable.   To find out exactly what this component is, 
however, would require further investigation.   Possibilities could include: allowing 
defendants to come to grips with the legal requirements of the Act; growing judicial 
awareness of the importance of the Act in facilitating information flows; the increase in 
the legislative maxima for penalties under the equivalent Australian Trade Practices Act; 
and experience with the effect of previous enforcement under the Fair Trading Act. 
 
To the extent that ‘CPI’ maintains real figures, however, ‘CPI’ is an optimal 
consideration. 
 
‘Intent’ 
 
The regression coefficient for ‘Intent’ is positive, as expected.   The marginal effect of an 
increase in ‘Intent’ has already been discussed above.   A unit increase in ‘Intent’ is 
correlated with a $6,002.00 increase in the size of the aggregate penalty. 
 
Legally, the significance of ‘Intent’ is obvious.   Its significance in terms of the theory of 
optimal judicial sentencing, on the other hand, requires some explanation. 
 
Assuming full information, the theory of judicial sentencing presupposes the existence of 
intent.   This is inherent in the assumption that criminals are rational utility maximisers: 
they think about the consequences of their action in advance.   More specifically, they 
only do something if the perceived or expected benefit of doing it exceeds the perceived 
or expected costs.   Criminal action, therefore, must demonstrate an intention to commit a 
crime.   This intention, in turn, implies an incentive or ‘profit’ exists for offending.   To 
this extent, the theory suggests that there is a potential for re-offending, and the potential 
for similar offending by others.    
 
One of the principal objectives of punishing criminal offenders is deterrence.   
Punishment increases the perceived costs of criminal activity: an individual will re-offend 
less and the potential for offending by others is diminished if there is some likelihood of 
punishment.   In this respect, judicial sentencing is about providing the right incentives to 
individuals. 
 
Why, then, is ‘Intent’ an optimal consideration if the mere fact of criminal activity 
indicates intent? 
 
At best, criminals, and indeed all individuals, can only maximise their expected utility.   
Without the assumption of full information, this leaves open the possibility for 
unintended action.   Imposing harsh penalties for unintended illegal action, however, may 
have the effect of deterring non-criminal activity.   Even if criminal activities are socially 
valuable, social resources are still used in their detection and conviction, albeit not in 
their punishment.   Given that the objective of the judge, in the theory of optimal judicial 
sentencing, is to maximise social welfare, this would seem to imply that ‘Intent’ is an 
optimal consideration.   Furthermore, the optimal rationale for imposing a penalty, in the 
absence of criminal intent, is to raise the cost of making mistakes and thereby encourage 
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individuals to incur the cost of acquiring information.   Without some consideration of the 
degree of intent, it is difficult to envisage how judges could provide correct incentives to 
individuals in determining the appropriate size of penalties. 
 
‘Previous Offences’ 
 
The regression coefficient for ‘Previous Offences’ is negative, contrary to what was 
expected.   The existence of a previous offence is correlated with a $10,695.00 lower 
penalty.  Because 'Previous Offences' is effectively a dummy variable for repeat 
offenders, it is relevant to look to the literature on repeat offenders for an explanation of 
the counter-intuitive result. 
 
According to Garoupa, Polinksy and Shavell have argued that “it may be optimal to 
impose less severe penalties on repeat offenders.”32   In their most recent article, 
however, Polinsky and Shavell (2000) only argue that sanctioning of repeat offenders 
more severely cannot be socially optimal with optimal deterrence.   In other words, if the 
sanction exactly equals the harm caused by the offence, and the offence is committed, the 
gain to offender must have exceeded the sanction.  Social welfare therefore is higher as a 
result of the offending.  Raising the sanction for repeat offending will over deter the 
offender, and consequently reduce social welfare.  It is only optimal to raise the sanction 
for repeat offending if deterrence is inadequate (i.e. if there is under deterrence).  Where 
offenders are cash constrained, as most of the offenders who breach the Fair Trading Act 
are likely to be, this will be the case.   The theory, therefore, does not appear to support 
the negative regression coefficient for ‘Previous Offences’. 
 
An alternative theoretical explanation that does support the negative regression 
coefficient for ‘Previous Offences’ uses the conclusion that the severity of punishment 
(i.e. the level of the fine) for the same harm should be higher the lower is the probability 
of detection.    If the Commission monitored previous offenders more stringently than 
non-offenders, then it would be efficient to reduce the fine for any particular event.   This 
should also be the case if the prosecution costs fell with repeat offenders in that their 
previous record substituted for investigation. 
 
Aside from a theoretical explanation, it is possible that the reason for the result is simply 
due to the quality of the data.   On the one hand, there may not be enough concordance 
between the variable ‘Previous Offences’ and its theoretical counterpart (repeat offences): 
warnings, settlements and previous convictions were all taken into account in quantifying 
the ‘Previous Offences’.   On the other hand, there may not have been sufficient 
observations to generate enough variability between ‘Previous Offences’ and other 
variables in the study.    
 
The sign of the coefficient may indicate, for instance, that there is some interaction 
(multicolinearity) between ‘Previous Offences’ and another variable, like ‘Intent’.  Where 
two independent variables are highly correlated with each other, it is not unusual for the 
coefficient of one of the variables to have the wrong sign, or to be insignificant. 
                                                
32 Garoupa (1968) p 278. 
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'Previous Offences' could be correlated with 'Intent' or 'Date'.  A previous offence would 
provide reasonably strong affirmation that the offender intended to breach the Act.   It is 
possible that if there were only a few cases in which both factors were present, ‘Intent’ 
may account for the effect of both.   Perhaps more plausible, however, is that this variable 
is time related, and therefore correlated with ‘Date’.   This may explain the perverse sign 
of ‘Previous Offences’.33   Over time, people have more of an opportunity to repeat 
offend under the Act, and therefore it is possible that ‘Previous Offences’ is highly 
correlated with time.   It is likely also that Courts treat previous offences under the same 
Act more seriously than offences under different Acts.  Whichever scenario, it is likely 
that the current coefficient on ‘Previous Offences’ does not reveal anything does not 
demonstrate the nature of any robust relationship between the variable on the size of the 
aggregate penalty. 
 
‘Ability to Pay’ 
 
In terms of the theory of judicial sentencing, ‘Ability to Pay’ is clearly an optimal 
consideration.   It is a proxy for the idea that wealth varies among individuals, which is an 
additional variable in Garoupa’s model.   The regression coefficient for ‘Ability to Pay’ is 
strongly positive, as expected.   A unit increase in the defendant’s ability to pay is 
correlated with a $4,182.40 increase in the aggregate penalty. 
 
‘Cooperation with the Commission’ 
 
‘Cooperation with the Commission’ is also an optimal consideration.   It represents a 
proxy for the cost to society of detection and conviction, which is a basic variable in the 
model of optimal penalties.   The coefficient for this variable is negative, as expected.   A 
unit increase in Cooperation is correlated with a $2,996.80 decrease in the aggregate 
penalty. 
 
                                                
33 Multicolinearity between ‘Previous Offences’ and ‘Date’ was not tested. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, the economic theory of optimal penalties was applied to judicial sentencing 
under the Fair Trading Act 1986.   By applying the theory to judicial sentencing, judges 
are assumed to be rational, welfare-maximising decision makers.   In sentencing, they 
only take account of factors that maximise net social welfare.   These factors are taken 
directly from the model of optimal penalties. 
 
Data quantified from 84 Act cases were applied to an econometric model that 
incorporated variables approximating these “optimality considerations”.   The aim was to 
test the ability of this model to explain the average variation in the size of the penalties 
awarded under the Act. 
  
The econometric analysis revealed that several of the optimality considerations are 
statistically significant in determining the variation in the size of penalties under the Act.   
However, optimality considerations do not explain all the variation in the size of the 
penalties.   In constructing the model, some non-optimality considerations had to be 
included, as their omission would have invalidated the results.   In addition, some 
optimality considerations were not included in the model because they could not be 
quantified. 
 
The individual optimality considerations that were statistically significant were ‘Intent’, 
‘Previous Offences’, ‘CPI’, ‘Ability to Pay’, and ‘Cooperation with the Commerce 
Commission’.   The regression coefficients on these variables show that, all other things 
being equal, a unit increase in ‘Intent’ increased the aggregate penalty by $6,002.00, a 
unit increase in ‘Previous Offences’ decreased the penalty by $10,695.00, a unit increase 
in the ‘CPI’ increased the aggregate penalty by $75.27, a unit increase in the ‘Ability of 
the Defendant to Pay’ increased the penalty by $4,182.40, and a unit increase in 
‘Cooperation with the Commission’ decreased the aggregate penalty by $2,996.80.   The 
negative correlation of ‘Previous Offences’ with the size of the aggregate penalty is the 
only inconsistent result in the study. 
 
The ‘Number of Informations’ is, arguably, the only individually significant, non-optimal 
consideration.   The regression coefficient on this variable shows that, all other things 
being equal, an extra information will increase the aggregate penalty by $1,107.40. 
 
These results indicate that, if the Commission wants higher aggregate penalties, it should 
concentrate on cases with intent, where the defendant has the ability to pay, and it should 
increase the number of informations.   Alternatively, it should not pursue cases where the 
defendant has cooperated with the Commission. 
 
The significance of ‘CPI’, and the significance but controversial sign of ‘Previous 
Offences’, also suggest that time has an important effect on the size of the penalties 
awarded under the Act.   While the Commission can do little about this directly, some 
further work may reveal, for instance, that over time Courts develop an awareness of the 
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importance of the Act in facilitating information flows.   The Commission may then be 
able to adopt a more pro-active role in developing this awareness. 
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the results of this study indicate that there is a 
reasonable degree of consistency of judicial sentencing under the Fair Trading Act.   
More than 50% of the size of penalties awarded under the Act is explained by “optimality 
considerations”.   The rest is either explained by other considerations for which there 
were no data, or they are arbitrary. 
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APPENDIX A:  ENFORCEMENT CRITERIA1 
 
Investigation Criteria 
 
1. Major Market Problem 
Includes: 
 conduct that may adversely affect a large proportion of consumers or traders in a significant 
market; 
 widespread advertising; 
 a current Commission target issue or industry; 
 conduct of several traders or which is an industry practice; 
 a breach of a product safety standard. 
 
2. Blatant Disregard for the Law 
Includes: 
 previous enforcement action against the trader; 
 ongoing course of conduct; 
 prima facie evidence of deliberate deception; 
 consumers do not realise that they have been detrimentally affected; 
 a court precedent has been breached. 
 
3. Precedent 
Includes matters where a successful prosecution could result in: 
 setting a new legal precedent; 
 clarifying an existing legal precedent; 
 extending an existing precedent; 
 changing an unworkable legal precedent. 
 
 
Factors to consider in deciding whether it is appropriate for the Commission to 
investigate 
 
 Whether the matter would be more appropriately dealt with by another organisation or by private 
action. 
 Whether the Commission can deal with the matter practically and efficiently through enforcement 
action. 
 Whether the likely outcome would justify investigation. 
 
 
Enforcement Criteria 
 
General criteria: 
 
 What action is likely to result in lasting compliance? 
 The extent of consumer and/or trader detriment. 
 The enforcement history of the trader (previous warnings, settlements, or court action.) 
 Previous Commission dealings with the industry. 
 Precedent value. 
 Educative or deterrent value. 
 Whether there has been blatant disregard for the law. 
 If a product safety issue is involved, how serious it is. 
 Whether the trader has a compliance programme. 
 Whether there is likely to be a defence available to the trader. 
                                                
1 Investigation and Enforcement Criteria (Fair Trading Division, Commerce Commission, August 1998.) 
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Specific criteria: 
 
Warning 
 The breach is not deliberate. 
 The breach is an isolated incident. 
 The breach is not significant enough to require a settlement or court action. 
 
Settlement 
 There is sufficient evidence to shoe that the Act has been breached. 
 A real change in the trader’s conduct can be effected. 
 A better outcome in the particular market can be achieved through settlement than court action. 
 The Commission is prepared to proceed to court action if the settlement negotiations are not 
successful. 
Staff settlement if the settlement or undertaking involves: 
 Staff training. 
 The introduction of compliance programme. 
 A product recall. 
 Admitting the breach. 
Commission settlement if: 
 A precedent is sought. 
 A trader has contravened the Act despite a previous warning or settlement. 
 A serious product safety issue is involved. 
 There has been blatant disregard of the law. 
 There is extensive detriment to consumers and/or other traders 
 A trader has refused to enter into a settlement. 
 
Court Action 
 Payment of Compensation is sought. 
 Corrective advertising is sought. 
 Publishment of an apology is sought. 
 If the Commission is organising a seminar on the Fair Trading Act for the industry the trader is 
involved in. 
Pursuant to: 
 Section 40 of the Act where a conviction and imposition of a fine is sought. 
 Section 41 of the Act where an injunction is sought to restrain continuing contravening conduct. 
 Section 42 of the Act where an order for corrective advertising is sought. 
 Section 43 of the Act where orders for compensation, return of property, repair, supply of services, or 
variation or cancellation of a contract are sought. 
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APPENDIX B:  DATA COLLECTION AND SELECTION 
 
A. Source 
 
The data for this study was sourced from the Commerce Commission Fair Trading Act cases.   Eighty-four 
cases were quantified for the study.   These included most of the Commerce Commission cases brought 
under section 40 of the Fair Trading Act up to the end of 1998.   Not all of the cases were available, or 
existed in written form.   Some of the cases were not included in the study because either they were not 
completed or the Commission was still awaiting written judgments or sentencing remarks.   All the cases 
included in the study are recorded in Appendix E. 
 
No selection was involved with the cases.   However, the cases that were available tended to be cases that 
were successful and had sentences awarded. 
 
Only those cases that the Commission was party to are included in the study.   No private cases are 
included. 
 
 
B. Data Collection 
 
The data collected for the study was limited to the obvious details of the cases: details such as the decision 
date, the judge, the court, the facts of the case and the factors the judge discussed in the written judgments 
and sentencing remarks.   The general categorisations made for the facts of the case and the factors taken 
into account by judges were based loosely on the sentencing criteria developed by New Zealand Courts 
since the Act came into force on 1 March 1987.   A great deal of this precedent was originally imported 
from Australian precedent (Part V Trade Practices Act 1974) by the New Zealand High Court in Connell v 
LD Nathan.2   It has since formed the substantive basis of the Commerce Commission’s penalty 
submissions.   Information on sentencing criteria was gained from studying the Act itself, literature on 
penalties and the Act, discussions with Commerce Commission staff members and, in particular, Fair 
Trading Act cases. 
 
 
C. Data Recording 
 
Penalty was the dependent variable to be explained in the study.   Both the aggregate penalty and the 
separate penalties were recorded for each case.   Separate penalties are the penalties awarded in respect of 
each information♦, where more than one information is successfully laid in a case. 
 
Two techniques were used to quantify all of the possible explanatory variables. 
 
1. Actual presence of variables 
 
This technique records which of the variables are present in each case and, where possible, the extent to 
which they are present.  The technique relies on the facts or findings of fact in each case.   As a result, the 
technique generates a comprehensive set of variables that are capable of being interpreted independently of 
judicial reasoning.  
 
Each variable is subjectively assigned a positive value between 0 and 3.   The general categorisations are as 
follows: 
 
0 – not a factor in the case, or not clear from the facts 
                                                
2 (1988) 3 TCLR 362. 
♦ An Information is an official document, issued by the Commission and filed with the appropriate Court (i.e., with the Jurisdiction to 
hear the case), alleging a breach of a section of the Fair Trading Act.   The document is served to the defendant. 
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1 – minor factor 
2 – moderate factor 
3 – major factor 
 
What constitutes a minor, moderate, or major factor depends on the particular variable.   The specific 
categorisations are outlined in Appendix C. 
 
2. Judge selection and weighting of variables 
 
This technique weights the relative importance each judge attached to the hypothesised variables when 
sentencing. 
 
Each variable is subjectively assigned an absolute value between 0 and 3.   The categorisations are as 
follows: 
 
0 – not a variable explicitly taken into account by the judge 
1 – variable mentioned by judge without emphasis 
2 – some emphasis 
3 – lot of emphasis, often a statement that a factor is an important mitigating or aggravating factor, or the 
principle reason for the size of the penalty 
 
In addition, this technique records whether the judge considered that the variables aggravated or mitigated 
the sentence.   Aggravating factors are indicated by negative signs and mitigating factors by positive signs.  
 
 
E. Data Selection 
 
Not all the data were used for the study.   The data that were used included the statistical data and the data 
quantified using the first data recording technique.   The second technique does not produce data useful for 
an econometric study of the factors affecting the size of penalties under the Fair Trading Act. 
 
Judicial weightings were not used as explanatory variables.   If they had been used, this would have tested 
the extent to which the sentencing remarks bore any relation to the size of the sentence, not the importance 
of factors in the size of penalties.   In this study, the relation between the factors present in the case and the 
size of the penalty was examined, rather than the judge’s interpretation of those factors. 
 
Not all of the statistical data and data quantified using the first technique were used for the study.   The data 
that were not included and the reasons for their omission are explained in the remaining paragraphs. 
 
‘Physical Harm’ and ‘Pre-Sentencing Prejudicial Behaviour’ were intentionally omitted from the study.   
There were no observations for the former using the first data recording technique and only one observation 
for the latter. 
 
Other data excluded from the study were the per-information data.   This included ‘Penalties per 
Information’, ‘Section’ and ‘Defendant Type’.   With more time, it would have been possible to expand the 
study so that the unexplained or dependent variable was the penalty for each information.   This would have 
produced more observations, but may have distorted the results.3 
                                                
3 The per-information penalty would have produced an alternative set of data.   The set of data would have been larger in the number 
of variables and the number of observations.   The extra variables that would have been included have already been mentioned.   In 
respect of the number of observations, more than one observation is available for some of the cases where different, and in some cases 
the same, penalties are awarded for different informations. Because each information is laid either in respect of a different defendant 
or a different section there is some factual difference between each information.   This difference, however, was quantifiable in only a 
handful of cases.   Moreover, in most of those cases there were only one or two variations between the information observations.   
Given that there are over 20 variables, this would mean that where more than one observation existed for a case, those observations 
would be virtually identical.   This may have distorted the results in favour of the explanatory power of cases with more than one 
observation. 
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‘Market Type’ was also excluded from the study.   This was done because each market would have to have 
been included as a dummy variable.   There was no obvious theoretical or legal reason for looking at only a 
few markets and, given that there was not a great deal of overlap between the cases in terms of market, this 
would have involved a lot of dummies.   There was also no rationale behind ranking them.   (This was also 
the reason for excluding the variables: ‘Judge’ and ‘Origin of Complaint’.)   There was no obvious 
theoretical reason to spend time including and testing the significance of these dummies.   In respect of the 
variable ‘City’, Christchurch was included as a dummy for the sake of interest.   The highest penalties have 
tended to be awarded in Christchurch and Christchurch undertakes a large proportion of the Fair Trading 
Act cases.   ‘Court’ was also left in the study to test the idea that the higher the court the less conservative 
the court will be in awarding penalties.   (This theory supports ranking the variable ‘Court’ as 1 for district 
court, 2 for high court and 3 for court of appeal.) 
 
Because judicial selection and weighting data were excluded, ‘Deterrence’ was automatically omitted from 
analysis.   This variable was not recorded using the first data collection technique. 
 
Warnings were included as ‘Previous Offences’, which is for all intents and purposes a dummy variable.   
The distinction between “2a”s and “2b”s (see Appendix C for quantification technique) was also omitted 
for the ‘Consumer Prejudice’ variables.    
 
Including the maximum penalty was also problematic.   In terms of the theory of optimal penalties, the 
maximum fine (F) is assumed to be represented by the legislative maxima in the Fair Trading Act.   The 
problem with including the maximum fine, with only the aggregate data, was that each case or observation 
may involve more than one type of defendant (individual or body corporate) and therefore both maxima. 
 
To resolve this problem, a dummy variable for ‘Type of Defendant’ was included, to represent factors 
including the maxima: 0 represented cases brought solely against individuals and 1 represented cases 
brought against either body corporates or both body corporates and individuals.   In cases against 
individuals, the maximum fine is $30,000.   In cases against companies or both individuals and companies, 
the maximum fine is $100,000.   This abstracts from the fact that, where both types of defendants are the 
subject of a case, a separate fine will be levied against each, if each is convicted and not discharged, and the 
maxima in respect of each is different.   This method of including the maxima also abstracts from section 
40(2) of the Act.   Section 40(2) states that where more than one information is brought against a defendant, 
the maxima may or may not apply in respect of each information.    Number of Informations captures both 
sections and defendant differentials, but this does not necessarily mean that section 40(2) is applicable.   
Whether section 40(2) was applied or not was not recorded in respect of each case. 
 
Retrospectively, not enough data were collected, or collected with sufficient precision for the study.   The 
number of complainants would have allowed the utilisation of the ‘Origin of Complaint’ variable in the 
study.   Effort to ‘Correct the Breach’ would have been more useful if it were decomposed into the cost of 
correcting the breach and the cost of preventing further breaches. 
 
 
Benefit to offender (b) Harm to society (h)
1 Incidental profit 1 Freedom of choice prejudice to consumers
One type of harm to consumers.
2 Financial prejudice
2 Effort to correct the breach Another type of harm to consumers.
3 Safety prejudice
Another type of harm to consumers.
4 Physical harm prejudice
Another type of harm to consumers.
5 Prejudice to producers
Financial harm to competitive traders.
6 Degree of disemmination
b  = 1 - 2
7 Extent of departure from the truth
Inherent in the amount of harm done to consumers.
8 Extent of breach
h  = 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5
h = 1(8, 9) + 2 (8, 9) + 3 (8, 9) + 4(8, 9) + 5
h = [6 - (1 + 2 + 3 + 4)] + 5
Actual: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 are relevant.
Potential: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 are irrelevant.
Issue: whether harm to society refers to actual harm
or potential harm will have to be clarrified.
APPENDIX D:  APPROXIMATIONS OF "OPTIMAL CONSIDERATIONS" 
NB: this variable has no positive observations
Potential harm to consumers resulting from the
breach.
NB: this variable was not collected using the first
data collection technique.
Inherent in the amount of harm done to consumers.
Actual: the benefit to the offender refers to the actual
benefit to the offender. This means that 1 is relevant
but 2 is not.
Ex-post: the benefit to the offender refers to the actual
benefit less any costs of remedying the breach and/or
preventing further breaches.
This is the direct financial return to the defendant from
the breach - whether the breach was intended or not.
Ex-ante: the benefit to the offender refers the intended
benefit to the offender, ie the benefit before the
criminal act was executed. This seems to fit better
with the theory which implies criminal activity is
meditated: the individual is a rational economic
decision maker - this implies full information. If this
is the case, 1 will need to be qualified by intent.
The defendant may, voluntarily, incur costs to correct
the damage done by the breach, or to prevent the
breach reccuring. Theses are criminal costs
internalised by the defendant. To this exteht they
should be taken into account in calculating the net 
benefit to the defendant of commiting the breach.
Ideally, the costs of correcting the breach and the costs
of preventing further breaches should be separated.
The cost of preventing further breaches really falls
under the severity of the penalty. Unfortunately, the
measurement of the variable prevents this separation.
Issue: Whether this variable is ex-ante, actual or ex-
post will affect the approximation.
1 ? 1 Maximum fines under section 40(1) FTA
No obvious proxy for this variable.
2 Guilty plea
Guilty pleas reduce the cost of conviction.
F  = 1
3 Cooperation with Commission
Cooperation reduces the cost of detection.
c  = 1 - 2 - 3
1 ?   No obvious proxy for this variable.
1
2 Other sanctions
Data with no apparent relation to optimal penalty theory
Number of informations
Number of informations per section
Date
Court
f  = 1 + 2 City
Judge
Penalty submissions
Market/Market share
Characteristics of the defendant.
Sanctions are socially costly.   There may exist social costs 
from the imposition of penalties.
Penalties are the only form of sanctions allowed in the
Act. Courts do, however, take account of whether
compensation orders were made, whether there was
particularly bad publicity, ore simply whether the
defendant voluntarily incurred costs in mitigating the
effect of the breach It could be argued, therefore, that
these 'other' sanctions are a form of penalty - they
could be used to calculate an imputed penalty. 
Intent
Negligence
Public status
Type of defendant
Data approximations:
Influence of others
Previous offences
Premature prejudicial behaviour by Commission towards 
defendant
Section of Act
Ability to pay
Other sanctions
Cost to society of detection and conviction (c) 
Severity of punishment (f)
Conspiracy/organised crime.   Garoupa notes that a 
weakness of the model is that it is not characterised by 
strategic behaviour or interdependant behaviour.   P 287
Marginal deterrence. Polinsky and Rubinfeld: It may be less 
optimal to impose less severe penalties on repeat offenders.   
P 278
Marginal deterrence.   The sanctioning system must ensure 
that individuals, when faced with commiting several harmful 
acts, have clear incentives to choose the least harmful.   P 277
Wealth varies among individuals.   
The maximum fines provided in the FTA clearly do not
represent the maximum wealth of the individuals.
Maximum wealth of individuals (F)
Aggreagate penalty OR penalty per info/charge
Issue: are courts a sufficient substitue for the social
planner?
Additional "Optimal Considerations":
Probability of detection and conviction (p)
The probability of conviction can easily be estimated
using Commission data.
The probability of detection is problematic - the
Commission may have some estimate.
APPENDIX E:   RAW DATA
 = Judges' weightings
Y/N = Actual presence of variables in case
Reported Penalty C/I/B Date Court City Judge
Aggregate Per Charge
R(P) 8/Gall $750.00 $750.00 I 13(g) 1 1 4/20/88 DC Chch Fraser 1 0 N 0
R(P) 14/Sitmar $5,000.00 $5,000.00 C 13(g) 1 1 10/25/88 DC Auck Elliott 2 -2 N 0
R(P) 32/Rikstay $2,000.00 $1,000.00 C 13(a) 2 2 8/23/89 DC Chch Kean 1 -2 N 0
R(P) 35/Sunfrost $2,500.00 $2,500.00 C 13(j) 1 1 9/20/89 DC Auck Elliott 1 -1 1 -1
U(NW)(P)F 22/Lanes $7,200.00 $400.00 C 13(g) 18 18 3/13/89 DC Chch Holderness N 0 2 0
(A)R(P) 23/Lanes $7,200.00 $400.00 C 13(g) 18 18 6/8/89 HC Chch Tipping N 0 2 -3
(A)R(P) 4/LD Nathan $3,000.00 $1,500.00 C 29(4) 1 2 8/18/88 HC Wgtn Grieg N 2 2 -2
$1,500.00 13(a) 1
(A)R(P) 5/Farmers(Wgtn) $5,000.00 $1,250.00 C 29(4) 2 4 8/18/88 HC Wgtn Grieg N 2 2 -2
$1,250.00 13(a) 2
U(W)(P) 10/Farmers(Auck) $26,000.00 $2,000.00 C 13(j) 1 4 7/26/88 DC Auck Gallander N 2 2 0
$8,000.00 3
(A)R(P) 11/Farmers(Auck) $26,000.00 $2,000.00 C 13(j) 1 4 10/7/88 HC Auck Hillyer N 0 2 -3
$8,000.00 3
R(P)
54/Old Sydneham 
Jewellers $200.00 $100.00 C 13(a) 2 2 3/13/90 DC Chch Green 1 0 N 0
R(P) 40/Amark $4,900.00 $400.00 C 13(f) 1 3 11/15/89 DC Chch Erber 2 -2 N 0
$2,000.00 13(e) 1
$2,500.00 13(f) 1
R(P) 55/James $400.00 $200.00 C 13(e) 1 2 4/27/90 DC Dunedin Willy 0 0
$200.00 I 22(1) 1
U(P) 102/Egil $4,800.00 $200.00 I 24 24 12/18/91 DC Chch Bisphan 0 0
U(W)(P) 97/Fletcher Merchants $2,750.00 $750.00 C 13(g) 1 3 7/17/91 DC Wgtn Kerr N 0 2 3
$1,000.00 1
$1,000.00 1
U(W)(P) 52/Lee $100.00 $100.00 I 13(a) 1 1 12/13/90 DC Chch Holderness N 0 1 -1
(A)R(P) 57/M.A.T $1,000.00 $250.00 C 13(g) 4 4 5/31/90 HC Chch Williamson
U(P)F 104/Cummings $600.00 $150.00 I 13(a) 2 4 2/3/92 DC Chch Noble 2 -2 N 0
$150.00 13(g) 2
U(W)(P) 109/Dutch $46,500.00 $6,000.00 C 13(b)/22(1) 6 12 2/24/92 DC Auck Elliott 3 -3 N 0
$1,750.00 I 13(b)/22(1) 6
(A)(U)(P) 110/Wynotts $3,900.00 $650.00 I 13(b)/22(1) 6 6 7/13/92 HC Auck Fisher 3 -3 N 0
U(P) 72/Crescent $10,800.00 $600.00 C 13(g) 18 18 8/27/90 DC Chch Bisphan 2 -2 N 0
(A)U(P) 38/Inger("Warehouse") $1,000.00 $1,000.00 I 13(a) 1 1 2/20/90 HC Auck Wylie 0 2 2 0
(A)U(P) 42/Brixton $1,500.00 $750.00 C 13(a) 2 2 2/20/90 HC Chch Holland N 0 3 0
U(W)(P) 233/ANZ $16,000.00 $4,000.00 C 13(g) 1 3 2/13/96 DC Wgtn Ongley 1 -1 1 -1
$8,000.00 C 11 1
$4,000.00 C 11 1
U(P) 249/Bank Shoes $3,000.00 $1,000.00 C 27(4) 3 3 7/22/96 DC Lower Hutt Keane N 0 2 -1
U(P) 246/ Bond $63,000.00 $63,000.00 C 13(g) 1 1 5/7/97 DC Chch Green 2 -3 2 -2
U(W)(P) 423/Edge $50,000.00 $50,000.00 C 10 1 1 2/20/97 DC Wgtn Borrin 2 -2 N 0
U(W)(P) 229/ Mt Albert TV $3,500.00 $3,500.00 C 13(g) 1 1 12/1/95 DC Auck Roderick Joyce N 1 -2
U(P) 232/Rural $20,000.00 $7,500.00 C 14(1)(b) 2 4 9/27/95 DC Chch Holderness 2 -2 N 1
$2,500.00 I 14(1)(b) 2
U(P) 130/Hughes $20,000.00 $5,000.00 C 13(a) 2 4 12/11/92 DC Invercargill Hay
$5,000.00 I 13(a) 2
U(W)(P) 243/Kapiti $8,000.00 $6,000.00 C 13(g) 1 2 5/17/96 DC Wgtn Becroft N 1 2 -3
$2,000.00 C 13(I) 1 -2
U(P) 446/Prudential $23,000.00 $5,000.00 C 12 3 7 8/4/97 DC Chch Costigan N 0 2 0
$1,000.00 2
$3,000.00 2
(W)(P) 455/Leo Van Dijk $10,000.00 $10,000.00 I 24 1 1 7/23/97 DC Chch Kean 2 -2 N 0
(A)(W)(P) 474/Leo $10,000.00 $10,000.00 I 24 1 1 11/27/97 HC Chch Hansen 2 0 N 0
(W)(P) 231/Weatherall $28,000.00 $20,000.00 C 13(g) 1 3 5/30/96 DC Dunedin Everitt 2 -3 N 0
$5,000.00 I 1
$3,000.00 I 1
(W)(P) 294/Cole Myres $25,000.00 $7,500.00 C 29(4) 1 3 2/21/96 DC Auck Imrie N 1 3 -3
$7,500.00 1
$10,000.00 1
R(NP) 17/A&W Hamilton $500.00 $500.00 C 10 1 1 1/31/89 DC Chch Bisphan
U(NP)F 121/Alister Robb $500.00 $500.00 I 13(e) 1 1 7/13/92 DC Wgtn Unwin N 2 2 -2
U(P) 133/Alsam $15,000.00 $3,000.00 C 29(4) 5 5 8/11/93 DC Auck Cadenhead N 0 0
U(W)(NP) 204/Amark $600.00 $300.00 C 13(a) 2 2 2/17/93 DC Chch Hattaway
U(NP)F 256/Bayview $600.00 $600.00 C 13(a) 1 1 9/4/95 DC Palmerston North Lovegrove N 1 1 -1
U(W)(P) 440/Ben Rumble $8,000.00 $2,000.00 B 13(I) 2 4 8/19/97 DC Chch Doherty N 2 1 -2
C 13(j) 2
U(NP)F 250/Butlers $1,000.00 $1,000.00 C 27(4) 1 1 11/8/95 DC Auck Young 3 0 N 0
U(NP)F 112/Jap an save $13,000.00 $2,000.00 C 13(a) 1 4 3/25/92 DC Henderson Dehobakta 2 -2 N 0
$4,000.00 13(d) 2
$3,000.00 13(d) 1
R(NP)F 148/Callaghan $2,000.00 $400.00 I 14(1)(b) 5 5 2/18/93 DC Queenstown Neal 1 -1 N 0
U(NP)F 146/DN Govan $0.00 $0.00 C 13(g) 4 4 11/29/90 DC Wgtn Middleton N 0 N 0
U(NP)F 115/Bedford $3,500.00 $500.00 I 13(b) 7 7 5/13/92 DC Auck Callendar 1 0 N 0
U(W)(P) 113/Gibson $7,500.00 $7,500.00 I 11 1 1 8/2/09 DC Chch Erber 2 -3 N 0
(A)U(W)(P) 116/Gibson $7,500.00 $7,500.00 I 11 1 1 2/2/96 DC Chch Fraser 2 0 N 0
Appeal dismissed, not good data
U(W)(NP)F 129/Cadell $1,500.00 $750.00 I 22(2)(b) 2 2 6/15/92 DC Auck Cadenhead 1 -1 0 0
U(P) 149/Deka $4,000.00 $4,000.00 C 29(4) 1 1 10/5/94 DC Auck Bollard 0 1 1 -1
U(NP)F 153/Don Grindley $6,000.00 $1,000.00 C 13(g) 3 6 5/16/94 DC Chch Erber 0 0
3
U(NP)F
154/East Coast Credit 
Control $2,300.00 2000 C 13(I) 1 2 10/6/94 DC Chch Strettel
300 I 1
FTA Cases Independent Variables
Intent Negligence
Dependent Variables

Section 
penalty 
imposed 
on  Y/NY/N
# Infos 
per 
section
# Infos 
penalties 
imposed on 
Deterrence Previous Offences
Y/N 
Y/N  Y/N  Y/N  Y/N 
8/Gall 2a 0 1 0 N 0 N 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 N 0 0 0 0 1 0
14/Sitmar 2a -1 2a -2 N 1 N 0 0 1 2 2 0 2 0 2 0 N 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
32/Rikstay 3 -3 1 1 N 0 N 0 1 0 1 1 -2 1 -1 2 1 Y 2 0 1 2 1 2 0
35/Sunfrost 2b -3 1 0 N 1 N 1 2 0 2 1 0 1 2 2 0 Y 1 0 1 0 2 2
22/Lanes 3 0 0 -1 N 2 N 0 2 0 2 0 0 2 0 2 0 Y 2 0 0 2 2 2 0
23/Lanes 3 -3 0 0 N 0 N 0 2 -1 2 1 -2 2 0 2 -1 Y 0 0 0 2 1 2 -2
4/LD Nathan 2a 0 1 0 2 -2 N 1 2 0 3 3 -1 1 0 2 0 Y 0 0 2 0 1 1
5/Farmers(Wgtn) 2a 0 1 0 2 -2 N 1 2 0 3 3 -1 1 0 2 0 Y 0 0 2 0 1 1
10/Farmers(Auck) 2a -2 1 0 N 0 N 0 1 0 N/2 -3/2 -2 2 0 2 0 Y 0 0 0 0 1 1
11/Farmers(Auck) 2a 0 1 0 N 0 N 0 1 0 N/2 0 0 2 0 2 0 Y 0 0 0 0 1 0
54/Old Sydneham 
Jewellers 2a 0 2a -2 N 0 N 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 3 N 0 0 0 0 1 0
40/Amark 2a -2 0 3 N 0 N 0 2 0 1 1 0 2 0 2 0 N 0 0 0 1 0 1 -1
2
2
55/James 2b 0 2b 0 N 0 N 0 0 0 N 0 0 2 0 s82SPA 3 Y 0 0 0 N 0 2 0
102/Egil 1 -2 N 0 N 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 Y 2 0 0 2 2 1 0
97/Fletcher Merchants 1 0 1 0 N 0 N 0 1 0 N/2 -1/1 0 1 0 2 0 Y 1 0 0 2 0 1 -2
52/Lee 2a -2 N 2 N 0 N 0 2 0 2 3 0 1 0 1 0 N 0 0 1 2 2 2 -3
57/M.A.T N
104/Cummings 2a -1 2 0 N 0 N 0 0 0 N 0 0 2 0 1 2 Y -1 0 1 1 -1 1 0
109/Dutch 3 -2 3 -2 N 0 N 0 0 0 1 -2 -1 3 -3 1 1 Y 2 0 2 1 0 3 -2
110/Wynotts 3 -2 3 -3 N 0 N 0 0 0 1 -2 -2 3 -3 1 3 Y 2 0 2 1 0 3 -1
72/Crescent 2a -2 N 0 N 0 N 0 2 0 1 1 -2 2 1 1 2 Y 0 0 0 2 0
38/Inger("Warehouse") 3 2 0 2 N 0 N 0 2 0 3 2 0 N 2 2 0 Y 0 0 0 2 0 3 -1
42/Brixton 2a 0 2a 0 N 0 N 0 N 1 N 0 0 2 0 2 0 N 0 0 0 N 0 1 0
233/ANZ 3 -2 N 0 N 0 N 0 N 1 2 1 -2 2 0 3 0 Y 0 1 0 2 0 2 -2
3
3
249/Bank Shoes 1 -2 0 0 N 0 N 0 0 0 1 -1 -2 0 2 -1 N 0 1 0 1 -1 1 0
246/ Bond 3 -2 0 0 N 0 N 0 3 0 2 1 -2 0 3 -2 Y 1 0 2 2 2 3 -3
423/Edge 3 -2 0 N 0 N 0 2 -2 2 1 -3 0 3 0 Y 2 0 1 0 1 0
229/ Mt Albert TV -3 -3 N 0 N 0 3 -1 2 2 -2 0 2 0 N 1 0 1 0 3 -2
232/Rural 2a -2 2a -2 N 0 N 0 2 0 1 1 0 2 0 2 0 N 0 0 0 0 2 0
130/Hughes Y
243/Kapiti 1 -2 2a -2 N 0 N 0 0 0 1 0 -2 2 0 2 1 Y 0 0 1 2 1 1 1
446/Prudential 1 -2 N 0 N 0 N 0 0 0 2 1 -1 1 0 2 0 Y 2 0 0 0 2 0
455/Leo Van Dijk 2b 0 2b -1 N 0 N 0 0 0 N 0 -2 3 -2 2 -2 N 0 1 -1 1 1 2 -2
474/Leo 2b 0 2b 0 N 0 N 0 0 0 N 0 0 3 0 2 0 N 0 1 0 1 0 2 -1
231/Weatherall 3 -2 2 0 N 0 N 0 0 0 N -1 0 1 0 2 0 N -1 0 1 1 1 2 -1
294/Cole Myres 2a 0 2a 0 2 -2 N 0 1 0 2 2 -1 1 0 3 -1 Y 0 1 0 2 0 1 0
-2
-3
17/A&W Hamilton 2a N N N 1 0 Y Y N 2
121/Alister Robb N 1 1 0 N 0 N 0 0 0 2 -1 -1 N 1 0 Y 1 0 1 0 3 -1
133/Alsam 3 -2 2a 0 2 -3 N 0 1 0 3 2 -2 2 1 Y 1 0 1 0 2 -1
204/Amark 2a 0 N N 2 N 2
256/Bayview 1 0 1 0 N 0 N 0 1 0 0 -1 N 1 2 Y 1 0 1 2 1 1 0
440/Ben Rumble 3 0 1 0 N 0 N 0 0 0 0 0 0 N 0 0 1 0 3 -2
250/Butlers 2a 0 N 0 N 0 N 0 N 0 2 2 0 N 0 2 0 Y 1 1 -2 2 2 1 0
112/Jap an save 2a 0 2a 0 N 0 N 0 2 0 N -2 0 2 0 0 Y 0 0 0 1
148/Callaghan 1 0 2 0 N 0 N 0 N 0 0 -1 0 1 -3 N 0 0 0 1 0
146/DN Govan N 0 N 0 N 0 N 0 N 0 N 0 0 N 0 0 Y 0 0 0 1 0
115/Bedford 1 0 2a 2 N 0 N 0 1 0 0 -1 0 3 Y 0 N 1 0 2 0
113/Gibson 2b -2 2b 0 N 0 N 0 N 0 N 0 -2 2 -1 1 1 N 0 0 0 2 0
116/Gibson 2b 0 2b 0 N 0 N 0 N 0 N 0 0 2 0 1ground for appeal N 0 0 0 2 0
129/Cadell 1 -1 2a -2 N 0 N 0 N 0 N 0 0 1 0 2 -2 N -1 0 1 -2 1 0
149/Deka 2b 0 N 0 2 -2 N 0 N 0 2 2 -1 N 0 2 -2 Y 0 1 -2 0 11 0
153/Don Grindley 2a -3 2b 0 N 0 N 0 2 0 0 0 2 -2 2 0 Y 1 0 0 2 0
154/East Coast Credit 
Control
Ability to Pay
Independent Variables Cont.
Incidental 
Profit Guilty Plea
Degree of 
Dissemination
Co-operation 
with 
Commission
FTA Cases Cont.
Y/N  #/Type  Y/N  Y/N
Producer 
Prejudice
Efforts to 
Correct 
Breach
Y/NY/N 
Harm
Y/N 
Cost/ Financial Safety
Consumer Prejudice
Freedom of Choice
Market
Penalty 
submissions 
relied on
Max
8/Gall Photos 1 N N 0 N 0 1 0 Liability for Reparation 1 C 0 3 -2 3 -2 Y
14/Sitmar
Cruises 
(Australia) 3 N N 0 N 0 2 -1 N 0 C 0 3 0 1 0 Y
32/Rikstay Petrol Services 1 Y N 0 N 0 1 0 N 0 T 0 3 0 3 0 Y
35/Sunfrost
Canned 
Tomatoes 1 Y N 0 N 0 1 0 N 0 C 0 3 0 3 0 N
22/Lanes Appliance Centre 2 Y Y 0 N 0 2 0 N 0 T 0 3 0 2 2 Y
23/Lanes Appliance Centre 2 Y Y 1 N 0 2 0 N 0 T 0 3 0 2 2 Y
4/LD Nathan Dept. Store 2 Y Y 1 N 0 3 -3
Fact of conviction and 
publicity so far 3 CC 0 3 0 1 0 Y
5/Farmers(Wgtn) Dept. Store 2 Y Y 1 N 0 3 -3
Fact of conviction and 
publicity so far 3 CC 0 3 0 1 0 Y
10/Farmers(Auck) Dept. Store 2 Y Y 0 N 0 3 0 N 0 T 0 3 0 1 0 Y
11/Farmers(Auck) Dept. Store 2 Y Y 0 N 0 3 0 N 0 T 0 3 0 1 0 Y
54/Old Sydneham 
Jewellers
Antique 
Jewellery 1 N N 0 N 0 1 0
Compensation $1,030 
(s43), $510 Aust 
airfare. 0 C 0 3 0 0 0 N
40/Amark
Publishing/Adver
tising Space 1 Y Y 3 N 0 2 0 N 0C(Advertisers) 0 3 -2 3 0 N
N 0 2 -2
N 0 3 -3
55/James
Glass cleaner 
franchise and 
sales 1 N N 0 N 0 1 0
Compensation 
(2xs42) $12,000; 
$3,200. 0 C 0 3 0 3 0
102/Egil
Soft Toy 
Manufacturers 1 N Y 1 N 0 1 0
Compensation $5000 
+ Solicitors fee $1000 2 C 0 3 -3 2 0 N
97/Fletcher Merchants Hardware 2 Y N 0 N 0 3 0 N 0 C 0 3 0 1 2 N
52/Lee Firewood 1 Y N 0 N 0 1 0 N 0 C 0 3 0 1 1 N
57/M.A.T Toys C
104/Cummings Antiques 1 N N 0 N 0 1 0 Reparation $1050 3 C 0 3 0 0 1 N
109/Dutch Candles 1 Y 2 1 N 0 1 0 N 0 C 0 3 0 3 -2 Y
2
110/Wynotts Candles 1 Y 2 1 N 0 1 0 N 0 C 0 3 0 3 -2 Y
72/Crescent Jewellery 1 Y N 0 N 0 2 0 N 0 0 3 0 1 0 N
38/Inger("Warehouse") Dept. store 2 Y N 0 N 0 3 0 N 0 T 0 3 0 1 2 Y
42/Brixton
Car sales (2nd 
hand) 1 N N 0 N 0 1 0 Compensation $1200 0 C 0 3 0 0 0 N
233/ANZ
Banking (home 
lending) 3 YY/legal advice 1 N 0 3 0 N 0 CC 1 2 -2 3 0 N
-3
-2
249/Bank Shoes Shoes 2 Y N 0 N 0 3 -2 N 0 CC 0 2 0 1 2 Y
246/ Bond Electronics 2 Y N 0Y (press release) 2 3 -3 N 0 CC 0 3 0 3 -2 N
423/Edge Computers 2 Y 2 2 N 0 2 0 N 0 C 0 3 0 3 0 N
229/ Mt Albert TV Brownware 1 3 Y N 0 N 0 2 0 Publicity 1 C 0 2 0 1 0 Y
232/Rural Real Estate 1 Y N 0 N 0 1 0 N 0 C 0 3 0 3 0 Y
130/Hughes C Y
243/Kapiti
Home building 
and real estate 1 2 Y N 0 N 0 1 0
Publicity and 
compensation 2 C 0 2 -2 0 0 Y
446/Prudential Insurance 2 Y N 0 N 0 2 0 N 0 C 0 2 0 1 0 N
455/Leo Van Dijk Pyramid Selling 1 Y N 0 N 0 1 0 N 0 CC 0 1 0 3 0 Y
474/Leo Pyramid selling 1 Y N 0 N 0 1 0 N 0 CC 0 1 0 3 0 Y
231/Weatherall Jewellers 1 Y 2 1 N 0 1 0 N 0 C 0 3 -2 3 0 Y
2 1
3 2
294/Cole Myres Bikes 2 Y N 0 N 0 3 -1
Solicitors fines and 
costs 1 CC 0 3 -1 1 1 N
17/A&W Hamilton
Retail/The 
Warehouse 2 N N 2 T 2 1 N
121/Alister Robb
Advertising/Prom
oting 1 Y N 0 N 0 1 0 N 0 2 0 1 0 N
133/Alsam Toys 1 Y/deceived 1 N 0 1 0 Y 1 2 0 1 1 N
204/Amark
Advertising 
advertising 
space 1 Y/certificate N 1 T 2 2 1 N
256/Bayview Fish Retailer 1 Y N 0 N 0 1 T 1 3 1 1 N
440/Ben Rumble Cellphones 2 Y Y 2 N 0 3 0 0 CC 1 1 2 2 -2 Y
250/Butlers
Equestrian 
supplies 1 0 0 1 0 N 0 0 2 -2 3 0 N
112/Jap an save
Motor vehicles 
retail 1 Y -1 N 0 1 0
Y/s43 compensation 
order $16,875.53 0 C 0 3 0 1 0 N
148/Callaghan Timeshare 1 Y Y/Cutwright and Johnson1 N 0 1 0 0 C 0 3 -1 1 0 N
146/DN Govan Clothes retailer 1 N 0 N 0 1 0 0 C 0 3 1 0 N
115/Bedford
Advertisement 
for film and 
theartre course 1 0 N 0 1 0
Y/compensation s 43 
order $4 748.75 0 C 0 3 -2 2 0
113/Gibson Gameline 1 N N 0 N 0 1 0 N 0 C -1 3 -2 0
116/Gibson Gameline 1 N 0 N 0 1 0 0 c -1 3 0
129/Cadell Franchises 1 Y N -2 N 0 1 0
Y/compensation 
$11800.00 3 C 0 3 0
149/Deka Nightclothes 2 N 0 N 0 3 -1 N 0 CC 0 0 1
153/Don Grindley Car parts 1 N N 0 N 0 1 0 N 0 0 3 ?
154/East Coast Credit 
Control
Independent Variables Cont.FTA Cases Cont.
Y/NY/N  Y/N  What?share
Extent of 
breach
Y/N  Y/N 
Origin of 
Complaint
Extent  of 
departure from 
truth

CC/ Cust/ 
Trader
Public 
Status
Pre-sentencing 
Prejudicial 
Behaviour
Influence of 
Others Other Sanctions
Y/NY/N
Reported Penalty C/I/B Date Court City Judge
Aggregate Per Charge
FTA Cases Independent Variables
Intent Negligence
Dependent Variables

Section 
penalty 
imposed 
on  Y/NY/N
# Infos 
per 
section
# Infos 
penalties 
imposed on 
U(P)
202/Difarn (Dutch 
Deliveries) $3,000.00 $3,000.00 I 22(1) 1 3 3/22/94 DC Auck Rushton 3 -3 N 0
0 suspended 1
0 suspended 1
U(P) 111/Difarn (Velvet Bear) $6,500.00 $2,000.00 I 22(1) 2 7 12/7/93 DC Chch Erber 3 -3 N 0
$500.00 5
U(P) 449/Enerco $13,500.00 $2,000.00 C 13(g) 5 18 12/18/97 DC Auck Kerr N 1 2 -2
$1,750.00 2
$0.00 11
U(NP)F 70/Foodtown $2,500.00 $2,500.00 C 13(g) 1 1 8/21/90 DC Auck Kerr N 2 1 -3
U(NP)F 103/Grant Johnson Motors $1,500.00 $1,500.00 C 13(a) 1 1 1/24/92 DC Henderson Ruston 2 -3 N 0
U(W)(P) 96/Harbour Inn $2,700.00 $900.00 C 13(a) 1 2 6/17/91 DC Wgtn Kean 1 2 2 -1
$1,800.00 10 1
U(W)F 126/Harcourts $2,650.00 $650.00 I 14(1)(b) 1 2 11/3/92 DC Chch Holderness N 2 2 -3
$2,000.00 C 1
U(W)(P) 235/Kleins $6,000.00 $2,000.00 C 13(g) 3 3 2/16/96 DC Auck Boshier N 0 3 -3
U(P) 478/Johnson & Johnson $9,000.00 $9,000.00 C 13(g) 1 1 4/1/89 DC Auck Roderick Joyce N 0 1 0
U(W)(P) 172/Macaulay $50,000.00 $5,000.00 C 21(b) 1 4 6/9/95 DC Invercargill Moran 2 -3 N 0
$7,500.00 21(b) 1
$22,500.00 13(d) 1
$15,000.00 13(a) 1
U(NP)F 16/HW St George $750.00 $500.00 I 11 1 2 10/19/88 DC New Plymouth Dalmer 2 -3 N 0
$250.00 13(e) 1
R(W)(P) 175/Megavitamins $13,750.00 $1,250.00 C 13(a) 10 11 3/25/94 DC Chch Green N 2 3 -3
I 1
U(P) 469/NZ Office Products $5,000.00 $2,500.00 C 13(g) 2 2 12/10/97 DC Auck Lance N 2 1 2
R(W)U(P) 238/Noel Leeming $19,000.00 $5,000.00 C 13(g) 2 6 2/28/96 DC Chch Noble 3 -2 1 -1
$2,000.00 13(f) 2
$2,500.00 13(g) 2
U(P) 325/Pacific Telephones $7,500.00 $0.00 C 19(2) 1 4 6/24/96 DC Chch Somerville 3 -2 N 0
$2,500.00 13(g) 3
(U)(W)(P) 91/Collier $11,050.00 $850.00 C 13(g) 10 13 4/18/91 DC Auck Morris N 0 2 -2
13(I) 3
F 184/Rangi Savage $500.00 $500.00 I 13(I) 1 1 5/18/92 DC Wgtn Evans 2 0 N 0
U(W)(P) 441/Wright $15,000.00 $0.00 I 24 1 2 8/28/97 DC Henderson Robinson 3 -2 N 0
$15,000.00 1
F
26/Warwick (scott 
electronics) $600.00 $200.00 I 10 1 3 4/28/89 DC Auck Gilbert N 2 N 2
13(e) 2
(U)(W)(P) 193/Sweetline $0.00 $0.00 C 10 1 1 4/22/93 DC Palmerston North Ryan N 2 2 -2
(U)(W)(P) 25/Toy Warehouse $500.00 $250.00 C 13(g) 2 2 4/10/89 DC Chch Hobbs N 3 2 -1
U(P) 197/Village $2,500.00 $1,500.00 C 13(a) 1 2 11/18/93 DC Dunedin Everitt 1 -2 2 -2
$1,000.00 1
U(NP) 95/Truebridge $3,000.00 $1,000.00 I 14(1) 3 3 8/14/91 DC Levin Carruthers N 1 1 1
F 120/Aldaman and Cooper $5,300.00 $300.00 C 13( c) 17 19 6/10/92 DC Henderson Rushton 0 N 0
$100.00 C 13(b) 1
$100.00 I 13(b) 1
U(W)F 209/Woolworths $8,500.00 $8,500.00 C 29(4) 1 1 7/8/94 DC Auck Morris N 0 2 0
F
117/Richard waron (Kirby 
distributor) $0.00 $0.00 I 13(I) 3 0 5/29/92 DC Tauranga Kearney N 0 2 0
R(W)(P) 68/Chalmers $0.00 $0.00 I 22(2)(b) 8 0 7/6/90 DC Palmerston North Inglis N 1 N 0
U(W)(P) 124/Jason Victor Steele $5,700.00 $600.00 I 22(2)(b) 5 14 10/6/92 DC Chch Erber N 0 3 -2
$300.00 9 1 0
R(W)(P) 125/Steele $3,350.00 $400.00 I 22(2)(b) 5 14 12/17/92 HC Chch Tipping N 0 3 -2
$150.00 9 1 0
U(W)(P) 485/PKL $2,500.00 $2,500.00 I 13( C) 1 3 12/22/97 DC Auck Cadenhead 2 0 N 0
$0.00 C 2
U(P) 422/Quantas $8,000.00 $8,000.00 C 11 1 1 12/19/96 DC Auck Ruston N 2 1 1
U(W)(P) 451/Zennith $130,000.00 $5,000.00 C 13( c) 22 24 5/5/98 DC North Shore Gittos 3 -3 N 0
$10,000.00 I 2
U(W)(P) 438/Kearney $20,000.00 $2,000.00 I 13(g) 6 11 DC Chch Abbott 2 -2 N 0
$1,500.00 I 13(g) 4
$2,000.00 I 13(I) 1
$0.00 C " 11
U(W)(P) 106-108/Brian Kennedy $14,100.00 $2,300.00 C 13(d) 1 7 1/29/92 DC Henderson Imrie N 0 3 -2
$800.00 13(g) 1 -2
$3,200.00 13(d) 1 -2
$800.00 13(a) 1 -2
$4,500.00 13(d) 1 -3
$800.00 13(a) 1 -2
$1,700.00 13(a) 1 -2
Deterrence Previous Offences
Y/N 
Y/N  Y/N  Y/N  Y/N 
Ability to Pay
Independent Variables Cont.
Incidental 
Profit Guilty Plea
Degree of 
Dissemination
Co-operation 
with 
Commission
FTA Cases Cont.
Y/N  #/Type  Y/N  Y/N
Producer 
Prejudice
Efforts to 
Correct 
Breach
Y/NY/N 
Harm
Y/N 
Cost/ Financial Safety
Consumer Prejudice
Freedom of Choice
202/Difarn (Dutch 
Deliveries) 3 0 2b 0 N 0 N 0 N 0 N 0 -2 Y(2) -2 ?(1) 3 Y -1 Y -2 N 0 2 0
111/Difarn (Velvet Bear) 0 0 N 0 N 0 N 0 N 0 -2 Y(2) -1 1 3 Y 0 Y -1 0 0
449/Enerco 2b -1 2a 0 N 0 N 0 2 -1 0 -2 N 0 3 0 Y 1 0 1 0 3 -2
70/Foodtown 2b -2 1 0 N 0 N 0 1 0 N 01/not discourage compliance effort 1 0 3 0 Y 0 0 0 2 0
103/Grant Johnson Motors 2a 0 2a 0 2a 0 N 0 1 0 N 0 0 1 0 2 0 Y 1 0 2 1 1 0
96/Harbour Inn 2a -1 2b 2 N 0 N 0 1 1 N 0 0 1 0 2 0 N 0 N 0 2 0 2 0
126/Harcourts 2a 0 2a -2 N 0 N 0 N 2 N 0 0 2 0 2 0 N 0 N 2 2 0 1 0
235/Kleins 3 -3 N 0 N 0 N 0 1 0 N 0 -2 2 0 3 0 N 0 1 2 2 2 3 -2
478/Johnson & Johnson 2b 0 N 0 N 0 N 0 N 0 2 0 0 N 0 3 0 Y 2 1 0 2 2 3 -1
172/Macaulay 2a -2 2a 0 N 0 N 0 2 -1 3 -1 -3 2 -1 1 0 N 1 0 1 2 1 1 0
16/HW St George 2a -2 1 -1 N 0 N 0 N 1 2 1 -3 N 2 N2 (S27 CJA) Y 1 N 0 N 0 2 0
175/Megavitamins 3 -3 2b 0 N 0 N 0 2 0 2 2 -2 N 0 1 2 N 0 1 -1 0 3 0
469/NZ Office Products 2b 2 N 0 N 0 N 0 2 0 3 3 -1 1 0 3 0 Y 3 1 2 3 3 3 0
238/Noel Leeming 3 -2 0 N 0 N 0 2 -1 2 1 -2 2 0 3 0 N 0 1 1 2 2 3 -3
Y 1
N 0
325/Pacific Telephones 3 -2 2a -2 N 0 N 0 N 0 0 -1 2 0 3 0 Y 2 1 -2 2 1 3 -2
91/Collier 2a 0 0 1 N 0 N 0 2 0 1 2 -1 N 0 2 0 N 1 N 1 2 1 2 -2
184/Rangi Savage 3 0 2a 0 N 0 N 0 2 0 2 2 0 1 0 3 N 0 0 0 2 0
441/Wright 2b 0 2a -1 N 0 N 0 N 0 0 0 3 -3 3 0 N 0 0 2 2 0 2 -3
26/Warwick (scott 
electronics) 2a 0 0 0 N 0 2 0 0 -2 1 0 1 3 Y 1 0 0 0
193/Sweetline 3 -1 N 0 N 0 N 0 3 0 3 2 3 2 0 3 0 N 1 0 2 2 3 0
25/Toy Warehouse 3 -1 N 2 N 2 N 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 3 0 Y 1 0 0 3 0
197/Village 2a 0 1 0 2a 0 N 0 1 2 2 2 -2 1 0 2 0 Y 1 0 0 1 0
95/Truebridge 1 1 0 0 N 0 N 0 2 0 0 0 N 0 2 0 Y 0 N 1 2 0 1 0
120/Aldaman and Cooper 2a 0 2a 0 N 0 N 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 Y 0 N 1 0 1 0
0 3
0 3
209/Woolworths 3 0 2b 0 3 -3 N 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 3 0 N 0 4 0 2 0 1 0
117/Richard waron (Kirby 
distributor) 2a 0 2a 0 N 0 N 0 N 0 0 -2 2 0 1 3 N 0 N 0 0 1 0
68/Chalmers 2a 1 2a -2 N 1 N 0 N 0 3 2 -2 N 1 N 1 N 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
124/Jason Victor Steele 2a 0 1 1 N 0 N 0 N 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 N 0 N 2 3 2 2 2
125/Steele 2a 0 1 1 N 0 N 0 N 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 N 0 N 2 3 2 2 2
485/PKL 2a 0 2a 0 N 0 N 0 2 0 0 0 N 1 1 3 N 0 0 0 1 0
422/Quantas 3 0 0 0 N 0 N 0 N 0 2 0 0 N 0 3 0 Y 0 0 0 3 0
451/Zennith 2a -3 0 0 N 0 N 0 2 -1 N -1 -3 3 -2 3 0 N 0 N 0 0 1 2
438/Kearney 2a 0 2a -3 N 2 N 0 N 0 0 -2 0 2 1 N 0 N 1 0 1 2
0 3
106-108/Brian Kennedy 2a -2 2a 0 N 0 N 0 1 0 N -1 0 N 0 2 0 N 0 0 0 0 1 0
2a 2 2a 0 N -1 1 0
2a -3 2a 0 3 2 1 0
2a -1 2a 0 3 2 1 0
2a -2 2a 0 3 2 1 0
2a -1 2a 0 3 2 1 0
2a -2 0 0 1 1 2 -2
Market
Penalty 
submissions 
relied on
Max
Independent Variables Cont.FTA Cases Cont.
Y/NY/N  Y/N  What?share
Extent of 
breach
Y/N  Y/N 
Origin of 
Complaint
Extent  of 
departure from 
truth

CC/ Cust/ 
Trader
Public 
Status
Pre-sentencing 
Prejudicial 
Behaviour
Influence of 
Others Other Sanctions
Y/NY/N
202/Difarn (Dutch 
Deliveries)
Piecemeal 
candles 1 N N -1 N 0 N 0
Y/suspended 
sentence and other 
breaches (2) C 0 3 -1
111/Difarn (Velvet Bear)
Piecemeal 
work/toys 1 N 0 N 0 N 0 N 0 0 0 2 -2
449/Enerco Enerco Gas 2 Y N 0 N 0 3 -2 N 0 CC 0 2 1
70/Foodtown Supermarket 2 N 0 N 0 3 1 N 0 C 0 2 0
103/Grant Johnson Motors Car retail 1 Y N 0 N 0 1 0
Y/compensation in 
exchange in W 2 C 0 3 -2
96/Harbour Inn Fish retail 1 N 0 N 0 2 0 N 0 C 0 3 -2
126/Harcourts Real estate 2 0 N 0 N 0 3 0 N 0 C 0 3 0
235/Kleins Cheap jewellery 2 N N 0 N 0 3 0 N 0 C 0 2 -2 Y
478/Johnson & Johnson Pharmaceuticals 3 Y N 0 N 0 3 -2 N 0 CC 0 2 0 N
172/Macaulay Car sales 1 Y N 0 N 0 1 0 N 0 C 0 3 -1 Y
16/HW St George
Advertise lotto 
scam 1 Y N 0 N 0 N 0 N 0 C 0 3 -3
175/Megavitamins Vitamins 2 Y N 0 N 0 2 0 N 0 CC? 0 3 -2 3 -1 Y
469/NZ Office Products Office products 2 Y N 0 N 0 3 0 N 0 C 2 3 0 2 1 N
238/Noel Leeming Appliances 2 Y N 0 N 0 3 0 Wide media attention 0 C 0 3 -3 2 -1 N
-1
-1
325/Pacific Telephones Cellphones 2 Y N 0 N 0 3 -2 N 0 CC 0 2 -3 3 0 Y
91/Collier
Door to door 
sales 
(encyclopaedias) 1 Y N 0 N 0 0 0 N 0 C 0 3 3 3 0 N
184/Rangi Savage
Door to door 
(vacuums) 1 N 0 N 0 1 0 N 0 C 0 3 0 3 -1 Y
441/Wright Pyramid Selling 1 N 0 N 0 2 -1 N 0 C 0 N 0 3 0 Y
26/Warwick (scott 
electronics) Electronics 1 0 N 0 1 2 N 0 0 3 1 1 -1 Y
193/Sweetline
Confectionary 
distributor 2 N N 0 N 0 3 -1 N 0 C 0 1 1 2 0 N
25/Toy Warehouse Toys/carseats 2 N N 0 N 0 3 0 N 0 C 0 2 0 1 2 N
197/Village Butchery 1 Y N 0 N 0 1 -1 N 0 T 0 3 -1 1 -1 Y
-1
95/Truebridge Real Estate 1 N 0 N 0 2 2 N 0 C 0 3 -2 0 1 Y
120/Aldaman and Cooper
Avertising 
advertising 
space 1 N Y 3 N 0 1 0 Co'y paid Cox's fine0 1 C 0 3 -2 3 0 N
209/Woolworths Retail 2 N Y 2 N 0 3 0
Recall 
$10500/adverse 
publicity 2 C 0 2 0 0 0 N
117/Richard waron (Kirby 
distributor) Door to door 1 N Y 3 N 0 2 0 N 0 0 3 0 2 0 N
68/Chalmers
Videohire 
franchise 3 Y Y 3Y/singled out by commission = youngest most vulnerable member to sue 2 1 1 Effort to repay 1 C 0 3 0 1 1 N
124/Jason Victor Steele
Lawnmowing/co
mputer 
franchises 1 Y N 0 N 0 1 0 N 0 C 0 1 0 2 0 N
3
125/Steele
Lawnmowing/co
mputer 
franchises 1 Y N 0 N 0 1 0 N 0 C 0 1 0 2 0 Y
3
485/PKL Advertising 1 N N 0 N 0 0 0 N 0 C 0 3 -2 1 0 N
422/Quantas Airline 3 N N 0 N 0 3 0 N 0 C 0 1 2 2 0 Y
451/Zennith Advertising 1 Y Y 3 N 0 1 0 N 0 C 0 3 -2 3 0 Y
N 0
438/Kearney Finance 1[2] YY/state of mind 1 N 0 2 0 Adverse publicity 1 C 0 2 0 3 0 Y
106-108/Brian Kennedy Car retail 1 Y N 0 N 0 1 0
Y/s 43 compensation 
total 2690 + adverse 
publicity 2[$2000] C 0 3 0 1 0 N
2[$2000]
0
0
0
0
0
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APPENDIX F:   SHAZAM RESULTS 
 
See Appendix C for variable abbreviations.   (Nb. In the following regressions “c” refers to CPI, not 
Section.) 
 
 UNIT  6 IS NOW ASSIGNED TO: equationtests1 
 |_file input equationtestcommand3 
 UNIT  5 IS NOW ASSIGNED TO: equationtestcommand3 
 |_sample 1 84 
 |_read (g2) a b d e c f g i id j k l m n o p r s t u v w x yy z aa ac ad af ag 
 UNIT 88 IS NOW ASSIGNED TO: g2 
 30 VARIABLES AND 84 OBSERVATIONS STARTING AT OBS 1 
 
UNRESTRICTED REGRESSION USED IN STUDY 
 
Tobit regression on all the variables collected with the first data collection technique.   (See Appendix B for 
explanation and exceptions.) 
 
 |_tobit a b d e c f g i j k l m o p r s t u v w x yy z aa ac ad af ag 
 
 TOBIT ANALYSIS, LIMIT = .00     25 MAX ITERATIONS 
         4 LIMIT OBSERVATIONS 
        80 NON-LIMIT OBSERVATIONS 
 
 NUMBER OF ITERATIONS =  4 
 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE =  A 
 VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE =  0.13712E+09 
 STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE =  11710. 
 
                              ASYMPTOTIC 
 VARIABLE  NORMALIZED     STANDARD   T-RATIO    REGRESSION ELASTICITY ELASTICITY 
          COEFFICIENT      ERROR                COEFFICIENT  OF INDEX   OF E(Y) 
 B          .29532       .31666       .93261       3458.2        .2360    .1766 
 D         0.80892E-01  0.26381E-01   3.0662       947.24        .4309    .3225 
 E          .36496       .26814       1.3611       4273.7     813.5549 608.8858 
 C        -0.64148E-02  0.99076E-02  -.64747      -75.118      -7.0158  -5.2508 
 F         -.42214       .46661      -.90469      -4943.2       -.0506   -.0379 
 G          .35204       .30553       1.1522       4122.3        .2532    .1895 
 I          .46678       .17773       2.6264       5466.0        .4538    .3396 
 J          .17280       .17807       .97039       2023.5        .1772    .1326 
 K         0.78793E-01   .23979       .32859       922.67        .1773    .1327 
 L         -.38899       .20112      -1.9341      -4555.1       -.4766   -.3567 
 M         0.57213E-01   .26455       .21627       669.97        .0130    .0097 
 O        -0.40458E-01   .19496      -.20752      -473.76       -.0436   -.0327 
 P         0.96986E-01   .16805       .57714       1135.7        .1059    .0793 
 R          .21743       .16369       1.3283       2546.1        .2751    .2059 
 S          .27929       .28999       .96311       3270.5        .1265    .0947 
 T          .25901       .21108       1.2270       3032.9        .4898    .3666 
 U         -.18632       .26556      -.70161      -2181.8       -.1166   -.0873 
 V         -.85880       .40226      -2.1349      -10057.       -.1830   -.1370 
 W         -.21759       .14934      -1.4570      -2548.0       -.2115   -.1583 
 X         -.17417       .19975      -.87194      -2039.5       -.3317   -.2483 
 YY       -0.91969E-01   .41270      -.22285      -1077.0       -.1470   -.1100 
 Z          .32388       .33107       .97829       3792.6        .2114    .1582 
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 AA         .28944       .29694       .97474       3389.4        .1079    .0808 
 AC       -0.25726E-01   .25035      -.10276      -301.25       -.0483   -.0362 
 AD        -.16704       .31498      -.53032      -1956.1       -.0512   -.0383 
 AF         .24063       .22129       1.0874       2817.8        .6634    .4965 
 AG       -0.96050E-01   .13079      -.73441      -1124.7       -.1535   -.1149 
 CONSTANT  -721.80       524.80      -1.3754     -0.84523E+07 
 A         0.85397E-04  0.67588E-05   12.635 
 
 THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF Y > LIMIT GIVEN AVERAGE X(I) =  .8013 
 THE OBSERVED FREQUENCY OF Y > LIMIT IS =  .9524 
 AT MEAN VALUES OF ALL X(I), E(Y) =  11207.0781 
 
 LOG-LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION= -865.30951 
 MEAN-SQUARE ERROR= 0.11969258E+09 
 MEAN ERROR=  2419.1570 
 SQUARED CORRELATION BETWEEN OBSERVED AND EXPECTED VALUES=   .66315 
  
 Test for joint significance of the unrestricted model 
 
 |_test 
 |_test b/a=d/a 
 |_test d/a=e/a 
 |_test e/a=c/a 
 |_test c/a=f/a 
 |_test f/a=g/a 
 |_test g/a=i/a 
 |_test i/a=j/a 
 |_test j/a=k/a 
 |_test k/a=l/a 
 |_test l/a=m/a 
 |_test m/a=o/a 
 |_test o/a=p/a 
 |_test p/a=r/a 
 |_test r/a=s/a 
 |_test s/a=t/a 
 |_test t/a=u/a 
 |_test u/a=v/a 
 |_test v/a=w/a 
 |_test w/a=x/a 
 |_test x/a=yy/a 
 |_test yy/a=z/a 
 |_test z/a=aa/a 
 |_test aa/a=ac/a 
 |_test ac/a=ad/a 
 |_test ad/a=af/a 
 |_test af/a=ag/a 
 |_test ag/a=0 
 |_end 
 
 WALD CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC =   118.02700     WITH   27 D.F.  P-VALUE = 0.00000 
 UPPER BOUND ON P-VALUE BY CHEBYCHEV INEQUALITY =  .22876 
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RESTRICTED REGRESSION USED IN STUDY 
 
Tobit regression on only those variables which approximate Garoupa’s “optimal considerations”, and which 
are required for the purpose of joint (statistical) significance.   No linear restrictions are included. 
 
 |_tobit a b d c i k l m o p r t u v w / list 
 
 TOBIT ANALYSIS, LIMIT =  .00     25 MAX ITERATIONS 
         4 LIMIT OBSERVATIONS 
        80 NON-LIMIT OBSERVATIONS 
 
NUMBER OF ITERATIONS =  4 
 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE = A 
 VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE =  0.16657E+09 
 STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE =   12906. 
 
                              ASYMPTOTIC 
 VARIABLE  NORMALIZED     STANDARD   T-RATIO    REGRESSION ELASTICITY ELASTICITY 
          COEFFICIENT      ERROR                COEFFICIENT  OF INDEX   OF E(Y) 
 B          .43691       .29749       1.4686       5638.9        .3848    .2715 
 D         0.85803E-01  0.22528E-01   3.8088       1107.4        .5038    .3554 
 C         0.58322E-02  0.18577E-02   3.1395       75.272       7.0302   4.9600 
 I          .46504       .13040       3.5663       6002.0        .4983    .3516 
 K         0.88683E-02   .16517      0.53690E-01   114.46        .0220    .0155 
 L         -.25299       .16101      -1.5713      -3265.2       -.3417   -.2410 
 M          .13767       .20256       .67967       1776.8        .0344    .0242 
 O        -0.94865E-02   .14417     -0.65799E-01  -122.44       -.0113   -.0080 
 P          .21011       .12809       1.6403       2711.7        .2529    .1784 
 R          .16456       .14721       1.1179       2123.9        .2295    .1619 
 T          .32406       .16695       1.9411       4182.4        .6755    .4766 
 U         -.18380       .24384      -.75379      -2372.2       -.1268   -.0895 
 V         -.82863       .35586      -2.3285      -10695.       -.1946   -.1373 
 W         -.23220       .12996      -1.7867      -2996.8       -.2488   -.1755 
 CONSTANT  -6.2943       1.7993      -3.4982      -81237. 
 A         0.77482E-04  0.61295E-05   12.641 
 
 THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF Y > LIMIT GIVEN AVERAGE X(I) =  .7788 
 THE OBSERVED FREQUENCY OF Y > LIMIT IS =  .9524 
 AT MEAN VALUES OF ALL X(I), E(Y) =   11554.3757 
 
                                                  DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
  OB   INDEX      PROB(X)     DENSITY(X)  OBSERVED    EXPECTED   CONDITIONAL 
 
    1  -.28576      .38753      .38298      .00000      3513.6      ------ 
    2   1.4501      .92649      .13941      .00000      19139.      ------ 
    3  -.42554      .33522      .36441      .00000      2862.1      ------ 
    4  -.97221      .16547      .24869      .00000      1133.4      ------ 
    5  -.35307      .36202      .37484      100.00      3188.1      8806.4 
    6   .34693      .63568      .37564      200.00      7694.4      12104. 
    7  -.29243      .38498      .38224      400.00      3480.4      9040.4 
    8  -.17272      .43144      .39304      500.00      4110.9      9528.4 
    9  -.52125      .30110      .34827      500.00      2469.2      8200.8 
   10   .51184      .69562      .34996      500.00      9111.9      13099. 
   11   .49581      .68998      .35280      500.00      8968.6      12998. 
   12   .43176      .66704      .36344      600.00      8407.7      12604. 
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   13  0.69294E-01  .52762      .39799      600.00      5608.4      10630. 
   14  -.28391      .38824      .38318      600.00      3522.9      9074.0 
   15  -.67685      .24925      .31727      600.00      1917.4      7692.7 
   16  -.63558      .26252      .32598      750.00      2053.7      7822.9 
   17  -.32746      .37166      .37812      750.00      3309.3      8904.2 
   18  -.15840      .43707      .39397      1000.0      4191.1      9589.2 
   19   1.2982      .90289      .17177      1000.0      17345.      19210. 
   20   .21543      .58528      .38979      1500.0      6658.1      11376. 
   21   .12954      .55154      .39561      1500.0      6027.9      10929. 
   22   .80442      .78942      .28867      1500.0      11921.      15101. 
   23 -0.25567E-01  .48980      .39881      2000.0      4985.6      10179. 
   24   .18301      .57261      .39232      2000.0      6415.9      11205. 
   25   .54477      .70705      .34393      2500.0      9410.1      13309. 
   26   .34883      .63639      .37539      2500.0      7710.0      12115. 
   27   1.6153      .94687      .10823      2500.0      21136.      22322. 
   28   1.4573      .92748      .13796      2500.0      19225.      20728. 
   29  0.42646E-01  .51701      .39858      2650.0      5428.7      10500. 
   30   .28698      .61294      .38285      2700.0      7211.4      11765. 
   31   .38828      .65110      .36998      2750.0      8037.8      12345. 
   32   .45852      .67671      .35913      3000.0      8639.8      12767. 
   33   .40585      .65757      .36740      3000.0      8186.2      12449. 
   34   .35175      .63749      .37501      3000.0      7734.0      12132. 
   35  -.38990      .34830      .36974      3000.0      3019.3      8668.4 
   36   .16755      .56653      .39338      3350.0      6302.2      11124. 
   37   1.3337      .90885      .16393      3500.0      17760.      19541. 
   38  -.21522      .41480      .38981      3500.0      3878.8      9351.1 
   39   1.1990      .88473      .19443      3900.0      16200.      18310. 
   40   .40953      .65892      .36685      4000.0      8217.4      12471. 
   41   1.0980      .86390      .21833      4800.0      15060.      17433. 
   42   1.3405      .90996      .16245      4900.0      17839.      19605. 
   43   .69950      .75788      .31236      5000.0      10874.      14347. 
   44   .63013      .73570      .32711      5000.0      10205.      13871. 
   45   .68140      .75219      .31629      5000.0      10697.      14221. 
   46   1.4389      .92490      .14169      5300.0      19004.      20548. 
   47   .16755      .56653      .39338      5700.0      6302.2      11124. 
   48   .77578      .78106      .29527      6000.0      11631.      14892. 
   49   .62498      .73401      .32816      6000.0      10156.      13836. 
   50   1.0985      .86401      .21821      6500.0      15066.      17437. 
   51   1.5004      .93325      .12944      7200.0      19743.      21155. 
   52   1.5004      .93325      .12944      7200.0      19743.      21155. 
   53   .29874      .61743      .38153      7500.0      7304.7      11831. 
   54   1.4256      .92301      .14441      7500.0      18847.      20419. 
   55   .55582      .71083      .34184      8000.0      9511.1      13380. 
   56   .33761      .63217      .37684      8000.0      7618.2      12051. 
   57   1.6632      .95186      .10006      8000.0      21723.      22822. 
   58  -.17159      .43188      .39311      8500.0      4117.2      9533.2 
   59  -.78183      .21716      .29389      9000.0      1601.7      7375.9 
   60   .62470      .73391      .32822      10000.      10153.      13834. 
   61   .62470      .73391      .32822      10000.      10153.      13834. 
   62   2.7076      .99661     0.10208E-01  10800.      34959.      35078. 
   63   1.3078      .90453      .16963      11050.      17457.      19299. 
   64   .75784      .77573      .29936      13000.      11451.      14762. 
   65   2.2786      .98865     0.29750E-01  13500.      29458.      29796. 
   66   .33587      .63151      .37706      13750.      7604.0      12041. 
   67   .59744      .72489      .33374      14100.      9896.7      13653. 
   68   1.2091      .88668      .19208      15000.      16315.      18400. 
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   69   2.0960      .98196     0.44351E-01  15000.      27136.      27635. 
   70   1.3359      .90921      .16344      16000.      17786.      19562. 
   71   2.6882      .99641     0.10756E-01  19000.      34709.      34835. 
   72   2.1615      .98467     0.38585E-01  20000.      27967.      28402. 
   73  0.58463E-02  .50233      .39894      20000.      5186.7      10325. 
   74   2.5684      .99489     0.14738E-01  20000.      33170.      33340. 
   75   2.1116      .98264     0.42925E-01  23000.      27333.      27816. 
   76   .45732      .67628      .35933      25000.      8629.2      12760. 
   77   .31873      .62503      .37918      26000.      7465.0      11943. 
   78   .31873      .62503      .37918      26000.      7465.0      11943. 
   79   1.6308      .94853      .10554      28000.      21326.      22483. 
   80   2.1507      .98425     0.39492E-01  46500.      27830.      28275. 
   81   2.6851      .99637     0.10848E-01  50000.      34669.      34795. 
   82   1.7932      .96353     0.79917E-01  50000.      23331.      24214. 
   83   2.2112      .98649     0.34608E-01  63000.      28600.      28991. 
   84   5.4537      1.0000     0.13881E-06 0.13000E+06  70387.      70387. 
 
Test for joint significance of the restricted model 
 
 |_test 
 |_test b/a=d/a 
 |_test d/a=c/a 
 |_test c/a=i/a 
 |_test i/a=k/a 
 |_test k/a=l/a 
 |_test l/a=m/a 
 |_test m/a=o/a 
 |_test o/a=p/a 
 |_test p/a=r/a 
 |_test r/a=t/a 
 |_test t/a=u/a 
 |_test u/a=v/a 
 |_test v/a=w/a 
 |_test w/a=0 
 |_end 
  
 WALD CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC =   46.390500   WITH   14 D.F.  P-VALUE =  .00002 
 UPPER BOUND ON P-VALUE BY CHEBYCHEV INEQUALITY =  .30179 
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LINEAR RESTRICTIONS 
 
See Appendix D for linear restrictions. 
 
 |_test r/a = -p/a 
 TEST VALUE =  3681.8     STD. ERROR OF TEST VALUE   2635.9 
 ASYMPTOTIC NORMAL STATISTIC =  1.3968200      P-VALUE=  .08123 
 WALD CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC =  1.9511061     WITH  1 D.F.  P-VALUE=  .16247 
 UPPER BOUND ON P-VALUE BY CHEBYCHEV INEQUALITY =  .51253 
 |_test (i/a)*(r/a)=-p/a 
 TEST VALUE =  0.13918E+08 STD. ERROR OF TEST VALUE  0.10147E+08 
 ASYMPTOTIC NORMAL STATISTIC =  1.3716434      P-VALUE =  .08509 
 WALD CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC =  1.8814060     WITH  1 D.F.  P-VALUE =  .17017 
 UPPER BOUND ON P-VALUE BY CHEBYCHEV INEQUALITY =  .53152 
 |_test 
 |_test k/a =l/a 
 |_test l/a=m/a 
 |_test m/a=o/a 
 |_end 
 WALD CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC =  3.6365980     WITH  3 D.F.  P-VALUE =  .30347 
 UPPER BOUND ON P-VALUE BY CHEBYCHEV INEQUALITY =  .82495 
 |_test 
 |_test x/a=-k/a 
 |_test k/a=l/a 
 |_test l/a=m/a 
 |_test m/a=-o/a 
 |_end 
 WALD CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC =  5.6015691     WITH  4 D.F.  P-VALUE =  .23094 
 UPPER BOUND ON P-VALUE BY CHEBYCHEV INEQUALITY =  .71409 
 |_test 
 |_test d/a=e/a 
 |_test e/a=f/a 
 |_test f/a=g/a 
 |_test g/a=j/a 
 |_test j/a=s/a 
 |_test s/a=t/a 
 |_test t/a=v/a 
 |_test v/a=x/a 
 |_test x/a=yy/a 
 |_test yy/a=z/a 
 |_test z/a=aa/a 
 |_test aa/a=ac/a 
 |_test ac/a=ad/a 
 |_test ad/a=af/a 
 |_test af/a=ag/a 
 |_test ag/a=0 
 |_end 
 WALD CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC =  48.655323     WITH  16 D.F.  P-VALUE =  .00004 
 UPPER BOUND ON P-VALUE BY CHEBYCHEV INEQUALITY =  .32884 
 |_test 
 |_test e/a=f/a 
 |_test f/a=j/a 
 |_test j/a=s/a 
 |_test s/a=t/a 
 |_test t/a=x/a 
 |_test x/a=yy/a 
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 |_test yy/a=z/a 
 |_test z/a=aa/a 
 |_test aa/a=ac/a 
 |_test ac/a=ad/a 
 |_test ad/a=af/a 
 |_test af/a=ag/a 
 |_test ag/a=0 
 |_end 
 WALD CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC =  18.429372     WITH  13 D.F.  P-VALUE =  .14189 
 UPPER BOUND ON P-VALUE BY CHEBYCHEV INEQUALITY =  .70540 
 |_test 
 |_test e/a=f/a 
 |_test f/a=g/a 
 |_test g/a=j/a 
 |_test j/a=s/a 
 |_test s/a=x/a 
 |_test x/a=yy/a 
 |_test yy/a=z/a 
 |_test z/a=aa/a 
 |_test aa/a=ac/a 
 |_test ac/a=ad/a 
 |_test ad/a=af/a 
 |_test af/a=ag/a 
 |_test ag/a=0 
 |_end 
 WALD CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC =  17.776014   WITH  13 D.F.  P-VALUE =  .16621 
 UPPER BOUND ON P-VALUE BY CHEBYCHEV INEQUALITY =  .73132 
 |_test 
 |_test d/a=e/a 
 |_test e/a=f/a 
 |_test f/a=g/a 
 |_test g/a=j/a 
 |_test j/a=s/a 
 |_test s/a=x/a 
 |_test x/a=yy/a 
 |_test yy/a=z/a 
 |_test z/a=aa/a 
 |_test aa/a=ac/a 
 |_test ac/a=ad/a 
 |_test ad/a=af/a 
 |_test af/a=ag/a 
 |_test ag/a=0 
 |_end 
 WALD CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC =  36.659360   WITH   14 D.F.  P-VALUE =  .00083 
 UPPER BOUND ON P-VALUE BY CHEBYCHEV INEQUALITY =  .38189 
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 |_genr intbenef = i*r 
 |_genr benefit = intbenef-p 
 |_genr harm = k+l+m+o 
 |_genr actbenef = r-p 
 |_genr posharm = x-k-l-m+o 
 
 Tobit regressions on only those variables which approximate Garoupa’s “optimal considerations”, 
and which are required for the purpose of joint (statistical) significance, with valid linear restrictions. 
 
 |_tobit a b d c benefit harm t u v w 
 
 TOBIT ANALYSIS, LIMIT= .00     25 MAX ITERATIONS 
         4 LIMIT OBSERVATIONS 
        80 NON-LIMIT OBSERVATIONS 
 
NUMBER OF ITERATIONS = 3 
 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE = A 
 VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE =  0.20017E+09 
 STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE =  14148. 
 
                              ASYMPTOTIC 
 VARIABLE  NORMALIZED     STANDARD   T-RATIO    REGRESSION ELASTICITY ELASTICITY 
          COEFFICIENT      ERROR                COEFFICIENT  OF INDEX   OF E(Y) 
 B          .50364       .29842       1.6877       7125.7        .4863    .3241 
 D         0.67426E-01  0.21554E-01   3.1282       953.96        .4340    .2893 
 C         0.44087E-02  0.16466E-02   2.6775       62.376       5.8258   3.8831 
 BENEFIT    .12135      0.44093E-01   2.7522       1716.9        .0742    .0495 
 HARM      0.17821E-01  0.66799E-01   .26679       252.14        .1029    .0686 
 T          .39052       .15492       2.5208       5525.2        .8923    .5948 
 U         0.46141E-01   .23488       .19644       652.82        .0349    .0233 
 V         -.55644       .32387      -1.7181      -7872.7       -.1433   -.0955 
 W         -.16964       .12638      -1.3422      -2400.1       -.1993   -.1328 
 CONSTANT  -4.8582       1.6204      -2.9981      -68735. 
 A         0.70680E-04  0.55888E-05   12.647 
 
 THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF Y > LIMIT GIVEN AVERAGE X(I) =  .7569 
 THE OBSERVED FREQUENCY OF Y > LIMIT IS =  .9524 
 AT MEAN VALUES OF ALL X(I), E(Y) =   11885.9964 
 
 LOG-LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -880.66608 
 MEAN-SQUARE ERROR = 0.18493063E+09 
 MEAN ERROR =  2668.9000 
 SQUARED CORRELATION BETWEEN OBSERVED AND EXPECTED VALUES =  .46362 
 
 |_tobit a b d c actbenef harm t u v w 
 
 TOBIT ANALYSIS, LIMIT = .00     25 MAX ITERATIONS 
         4 LIMIT OBSERVATIONS 
        80 NON-LIMIT OBSERVATIONS 
 
 NUMBER OF ITERATIONS =  3 
 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE = A 
 VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE =  0.21847E+09 
 STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE =  14781. 
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                              ASYMPTOTIC 
 VARIABLE  NORMALIZED     STANDARD   T-RATIO    REGRESSION ELASTICITY ELASTICITY 
          COEFFICIENT      ERROR                COEFFICIENT  OF INDEX   OF E(Y) 
 B          .23594       .28765       .82022       3487.4        .2380    .1538 
 D         0.76670E-01  0.21715E-01   3.5308       1133.2        .5155    .3333 
 C         0.51312E-02  0.16255E-02   3.1567       75.843       7.0836   4.5792 
 ACTBENEF  0.55657E-02  0.75911E-01  0.73318E-01   82.265        .0012    .0008 
 HARM      0.37044E-01  0.66558E-01   .55656       547.53        .2236    .1445 
 T          .38690       .15496       2.4967       5718.7        .9236    .5970 
 U        -0.49060E-01   .23712      -.20690      -725.15       -.0388   -.0251 
 V         -.42476       .32014      -1.3268      -6278.3       -.1142   -.0739 
 W         -.21101       .12593      -1.6756      -3118.9       -.2590   -.1674 
 CONSTANT  -5.4021       1.6062      -3.3634      -79847. 
 A         0.67656E-04  0.53569E-05   12.630 
 
 THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF Y > LIMIT GIVEN AVERAGE X(I) =  .7484 
 THE OBSERVED FREQUENCY OF Y > LIMIT IS =  .9524 
 AT MEAN VALUES OF ALL X(I), E(Y) =   12117.6063 
 
 LOG-LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -884.46099 
 MEAN-SQUARE ERROR = 0.20646280E+09 
 MEAN ERROR =  2713.0339 
 SQUARED CORRELATION BETWEEN OBSERVED AND EXPECTED VALUES =   .38998 
 
 |_tobit a b d c benefit posharm t u v w 
 
 TOBIT ANALYSIS, LIMIT =  .00     25 MAX ITERATIONS 
         4 LIMIT OBSERVATIONS 
        80 NON-LIMIT OBSERVATIONS 
 
 NUMBER OF ITERATIONS =  3 
 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE = A 
 VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE =  0.19946E+09 
 STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE =   14123. 
 
                              ASYMPTOTIC 
 VARIABLE  NORMALIZED     STANDARD   T-RATIO    REGRESSION ELASTICITY ELASTICITY 
          COEFFICIENT      ERROR                COEFFICIENT  OF INDEX   OF E(Y) 
 B          .52799       .29325       1.8005       7456.8        .5089    .3396 
 D         0.64874E-01  0.21874E-01   2.9659       916.22        .4168    .2782 
 C         0.43268E-02  0.16440E-02   2.6320       61.108       5.7074   3.8094 
 BENEFIT    .12987      0.45778E-01   2.8370       1834.2        .0793    .0529 
 POSHARM   0.32610E-01  0.58479E-01   .55764       460.55       -.0283   -.0189 
 T          .39307       .15269       2.5742       5551.3        .8965    .5984 
 U         0.40772E-01   .23403       .17422       575.82        .0308    .0205 
 V         -.55075       .32336      -1.7032      -7778.4       -.1415   -.0945 
 W         -.17362       .12633      -1.3744      -2452.1       -.2036   -.1359 
 CONSTANT  -4.6881       1.5884      -2.9515      -66211. 
 A         0.70806E-04  0.55999E-05   12.644 
 
 THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF Y > LIMIT GIVEN AVERAGE X(I) =  .7572 
 THE OBSERVED FREQUENCY OF Y > LIMIT IS =  .9524 
 AT MEAN VALUES OF ALL X(I), E(Y) =   11873.7986 
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 LOG-LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -880.54618 
 MEAN-SQUARE ERROR = 0.18420046E+09 
 MEAN ERROR =  2658.4549 
 SQUARED CORRELATION BETWEEN OBSERVED AND EXPECTED VALUES =  .46479 
 
 |_tobit a b d c actbenef posharm t u v w 
 
 TOBIT ANALYSIS, LIMIT = .00      25 MAX ITERATIONS 
         4 LIMIT OBSERVATIONS 
        80 NON-LIMIT OBSERVATIONS 
 
NUMBER OF ITERATIONS =  3 
 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE = A 
 VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE =  0.21898E+09 
 STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE =   14798. 
 
                              ASYMPTOTIC 
 VARIABLE  NORMALIZED     STANDARD   T-RATIO    REGRESSION ELASTICITY ELASTICITY 
          COEFFICIENT      ERROR                COEFFICIENT  OF INDEX   OF E(Y) 
 B          .26186       .28320       .92464       3875.0        .2644    .1708 
 D         0.77157E-01  0.22187E-01   3.4776       1141.7        .5194    .3354 
 C         0.50836E-02  0.16227E-02   3.1329       75.227       7.0260   4.5373 
 ACTBENEF  0.54745E-03  0.80669E-01  0.67863E-02   8.1010        .0001    .0001 
 POSHARM  -0.14288E-01  0.59528E-01  -.24002      -211.43        .0130    .0084 
 T          .40474       .15319       2.6421       5989.3        .9673    .6247 
 U        -0.63117E-01   .23613      -.26730      -933.99       -.0499   -.0322 
 V         -.44816       .32122      -1.3952      -6631.8       -.1207   -.0779 
 W         -.21391       .12581      -1.7003      -3165.4       -.2628   -.1697 
 CONSTANT  -5.2421       1.5746      -3.3291      -77571. 
 A         0.67578E-04  0.53517E-05   12.627 
 
 THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF Y > LIMIT GIVEN AVERAGE X(I) =  .7483 
 THE OBSERVED FREQUENCY OF Y > LIMIT IS =  .9524 
 AT MEAN VALUES OF ALL X(I), E(Y) =   12128.6709 
 
 LOG-LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION= -884.58719 
 MEAN-SQUARE ERROR= 0.20710839E+09 
 MEAN ERROR=  2710.3538 
 SQUARED CORRELATION BETWEEN OBSERVED AND EXPECTED VALUES=   .38754 
  
LOG-LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION= -873.41822 
 MEAN-SQUARE ERROR= 0.15048700E+09 
 MEAN ERROR=  2551.9376 
 SQUARED CORRELATION BETWEEN OBSERVED AND EXPECTED VALUES=   .56685 
 |_stop 
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